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Barry Cahill* Sedition in Nova Scotia:
R. v. Wilkie (1820) and the
Incontestable Illegality of
Seditious Libel before
R. v. Howe (1835)
The author analyses a "rare" prosecution for seditious libel in early nineteenth
century Halifax. He argues that it is a paradigm example of the invocation of the
repressive apparatus of the state by the political and legal elites, which has the
ideological impact of stymieing reform initiatives. Parallels and differences are
drawn with another famous Nova Scotian case, R. v. Howe, and similar cases in
Upper Canada.
"I cannot help thinking that the severities exercised towards him [Robert
Gourlay] were injurious to the public peace, and, along with other acts of
a similar complexion, helped to originate an extreme party in the Upper
province [Upper Canada] of a radical or rather democratic character....
I think it right to notice occurrences of this kind occasionally, as the
progress of opinion in a colony often acts upon the feelings of other
communities where the constitutions are alike. The infringement of the
laws which protect the subject's rights in one province is calculated to
alarm all those in neighbor colonies who set a value on their legal
privileges."
-Beamish Murdoch QC, 1867
"He [Joseph Howe] had seen the Family Compact strike down one
reformer after another in Canada, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island
and Nova Scotia, by means of an indictment for criminal libel."
-D.C. Harvey, 1939
"As occurred in Upper Canada in the case of the rabble-rousing Robert
Gourlay, those in power in Nova Scotia opted to squelch this shrill voice
of protest [William Wilkie]."
-D.A. Sutherland, 1994
* Archivist, Government Archives Division, Public Archives of Nova Scotia; Editor, Nova
Scotia HistoricalReview. The author wishes to thank Professor Philip Girard of Dalhousie Law
School for numerous helpful criticisms and suggestions.
Sedition in Nova Scotia
Introduction
Writing in the posthumously published final version of his historical
chronicle of early Halifax town, lawyer-archivist Thomas Beamish
Akins condemned the infamous 1820 state trial, R. v. Wilkie, in these
memorable words:
An anonymous pamphlet was published from the press of A.H. [Anthony
Henry] Holland, charging the magistrates of the town with malpractices,
which caused much excitement. It was discovered to have been written by
Mr. William Wilkie, of Halifax. He was indicted for libel, tried at the
Easter term of the Supreme Court [17 April 1820] and sentenced to two
years imprisonment with hard labor in the House of Correction [Bridewell].
This was esteemed a most tyrannical and cruel proceeding on the part of
the government. The pamphlet was a very paltry offence, such as at the
present day [1839] would be passed over with contempt. Wilkie, though
not a person of much esteem, yet being a member of a respectable family
in the community, should have been spared the indignities thrown upon
him by Chief Justice [Sampson Salter] Blowers and the other Judges of the
Supreme Court. After the sentence was known, the sympathy in his favor
was very general throughout the town.'
Akins'sjeremiad begs to be contrasted with a later, perfunctory treatment
of the same event by the lawyer-chronicler, Beamish Murdoch, whose
narrative history of Nova Scotia contains a rather obtuse account which
omits mentioning the accused by name or even specifying the crime:
At the April term [ 1820] of the Supreme Court at Halifax, a young man,
who had published a pamphlet, imputing blame to the magistrates in
pecuniary matters, and to H. M. council, for neglect of duty in not auditing
their accounts according to law, was sentenced to two years imprisonment
in the house of correction, at hard labor.2
1. T.B. Alkins, "History of Halifax City" (1895) 8 NS Historical Society Collections
[hereinafter Collections] at 195. (Akins's "History" originated as a paper read to the Halifax
Mechanics' Institute in 1839 and was first published in pamphlet form in 1847.) Akins himself,
having been born in 1809, was not old enough to have formed a personal opinion of the merits
of Wilkie at the time. A bibliomane, Akins's private library at one time held two copies of
'Wilkie's': S.I. Stewart, comp., A Catalogue of TheAkins Collection of Books and Pamphlets
(Halifax: PANS, 1933) at 79.
2. B. Murdoch, A History of Nova-Scotia, orAcadie (Halifax: J. Barnes, 1867) vol. 3 at 454.
Murdoch's intention may well have been to spare the feelings of William Wilkie's elder
brother, the merchant James Charles William Willde (1788-1867), who was a prominent and
highly-regarded citizen of Halifax, having served for many years as clerk, then cashier/
accountant, of the Halifax Banking Company ["Collins's Bank"]. The "young man" in any case
was identified by the Murdoch annotator, William John Stirling, as "A worthless profligate
named Willde," Public Archives of NS [hereinafterPANS],RG 1,vol.525,'at454[marginalium].
Stirling, however, had an axe to grind: he was the son of the late Dr. John Stirling, who had been
party to a sensational Supreme Court case in 1819, which Wilkie ridiculed in his pamphlet as
a "judicial farce"; see infra.
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R. v. Wilkie is also conspicuous by its absence from Murdoch's much
earlier Epitome of the Laws of Nova-Scotia (1832-33), though 'Nova
Scotia's Blackstone' was at the time serving his pupillage in the office of
Attorney-General Richard John Uniacke, and routinely took shorthand
notes of important trials in the Supreme Court. Even forty years after the
event, when his memory of the trial and conviction of Wilkie must have
begun to fade, Murdoch was capable of treating Wilkie only with extreme
circumspection. Murdoch rose conspicuously and eloquently to the
defence of the Upper Canadian, Gourlay; why not also to that of his fellow
Nova Scotian, Wilkie?
The exceedingly meagre historiography of Wilkie rests on the dual
basis that William Wilkie was the Nova Scotian parallel to Robert
Gourlay, "the best-known radical" of the pre-Rebellion era,3 and the
precursor of Joseph Howe.4 While there is something to be said for these
arguments from analogy-Gourlay was twice tried unsuccessfully for
seditious libel on the eve of Wilkie' s prosecution, and Howe was tried and
acquitted of seditious libel fifteen years after-neither approach ad-
dresses the significance of Wilkie as alegal proceeding for a crime against
the state, nor analyses it as a successful exercise in the official repression
of political dissent.' This is not to say that the local impact of the trial
exceeded its comparative historical value; simply that the conviction,
Against Murdoch's discreet uninterest in Wilkie must beset his muscular critique of Upper
Canada's Seditious Meetings Act and Sedition Act, and his defence of Robert Gourlay
("Gourlay was certainly a radical reformer of the extreme English type of that period,--friend
and follower of [William] Cobbett, [William] Hone, &c."): Ibid., at 428-29.
3. See for example, D.A. Sutherland, "Willde, William," Dictionary of Cdn. Biography
[hereinafter DCB], vol. 5 at 853-54; "The Merchants of Halifax, 1815-1850: A Commercial
Class in Pursuit of Metropolitan Status" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1975) at 117-18,
134 (nn. 59-62), "1810-1820: War and Peace" in P.A. Buckner & J.G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic
Region to Confederation: A History (Toronto & Fredericton: University of Toronto Press
1994) 234 at 258-9. Here, for the first time, R. v. Wilkie is correctly identified as a case of
"seditious libel."
4. G.V.V. Nicholls, "A Forerunner of Joseph Howe" (1927) 8 CHR 224-32. No attempt is
made in the course of this ambitious undergraduate article to develop the promising theme of
its title. S.D. Clark, Movements ofPoliticalProtestin Canada 1640-1840 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press 1959), who has heard of Gourlay, knows nothing about Wilkie or Howe. The
Nova Scotian segment of Clark's account (at 131 et seq.), which confines itself to the period
up to and including the War of 1812-before there were any movements of political protest in
Nova Scotia-thus begins too early and ends too soon to realize the stated purpose of his
inquiry.
5. On this subject see J.S. Martell, "Origins ofSelf-Government in Nova Scotia: 1815-1836"
(Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1935) at 178-80, 375-76. It is suggestive of the
misconceived relative importance of the two trials that Wilkie was completely ignored by both
Howe himself and historians of Howe, though Howe has by no means been ignored by
historians of Wilkie. The only student of Howe to have pursued the comparison was its
centenary historian, George Farquhar:
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penal sentencing and apparent banishment of Wilkie administered a
quietus which deferred for ten years the movement towards law reform.
It was also a premature birth, or false start, to the movement for political
reform.
The reform movement began in earnest as a result of the bitterly-
contested "Brandy Election" of 1830, in which the struggle between the
executive-cum-legislative-cum-judicial Council of Twelve and the rep-
resentative Assembly precipitated the final collapse of the Loyalist
Ascendancy, which had subsisted for nearly forty years. The second
reform movement also climaxed in a seditious libel prosecution-of the
vanguard of the "emergent opposition press," Joseph Howe-whose
newspaper, the Novascotian; or Colonial Advocate was to Halifax what
William Lyon Mackenzie's Colonial Advocate was to York-Toronto.
The attempt to silence Howe failed as spectacularly in 1835 as the attempt
to silence William Wilkie by the same means had succeeded in 1820,
largely because Howe confined his attacks to the magistrates of Halifax.
Wilkie, on the other hand, commenced with the local magistracy but then
broadened the scope of his attack to include every institution of govern-
ment, save only the lieutenant-governor. Wilkie, a mere eight years older
than Howe, epitomized the young man of destiny in a hurry; he was sadly
out of his depth and ahead of his time.
The significance of Wilkie for criminal justice history lies in the fact
that, while it was by no means the first state trial to have taken place in
the province, it was almost certainly the first prosecution for 'public' or
'political' libel.6 This paper attempts to superimpose on the Nova Scotian
evidence the theoretical apparatus deployed by Barry Wright in his
recent, ground-breaking study, "Sedition in Upper Canada: Contested
Legality," 7 by focusing on the Wilkie sedition trial as the oligarchy's
instinctive response to the challenge of published public criticism. That
this response assumed the form of legal proceedings for a crime against
the state-seditious libel-is hardly surprising, in view of the fact that
For Howe knew only too well the hazards that he ran, as only a short [sic: fifteen years]
time before William Wilkie was sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labor
for the identical offence which Howe dared to perpetrate in defiance of a tyrannous
authority and in protest against the oppression of the people:
G. Farquhar, "Centenary of Triumphant Battle forFreedom of Nova Scotia's Press" (1935) 3:1
Port and Province at 13. With the sole exception of Farquhar, nowhere in the substantial
literature on the Howe sedition trial is the precedent Wilkie trial referred to.
6. Among the eighteenth-century Nova Scotian precedents were Hoffman (1754) for seditious
conspiracy, Houghton (1777) for seditious slander, and the treason trials consequent on the
patriot investment of Fort Cumberland [Beaus~jour in 1776.
7. Labour/Le Travail, 29 (Spring 1992) at 7-57.
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three of the four judges of the Supreme Court, as well as the attorney-
general, were at that time members of the Council, which one early
twentieth-century wag likened to Nova Scotia's Star Chamber.' The
prosecutorial and judicial functions of the administration of criminal
justice could not be considered in any degree separate or even separable.
Procedurally speaking, the integrated oligarchical structure of colonial
government affected the administration of criminal justice in a manner
which accentuated the interoperation, rather than the separation of
powers. The crown prosecutorial and judicial authorities were interde-
pendent, rather than independent of government (of which they formed
the most influential, if not the most important part).
The two Nova Scotian seditious libel cases-unlike Upper Canada,
there was not a concatenation of cases-permit only a qualitative analysis
of the significance of political prosecutions in the criminal courts, not
their quantification. The thirty-four common-law sedition prosecutions
in Upper Canada between 1794 and 1828, tabulated by Wright,9 corre-
spond to oniy one in Nova Scotia during the same period. Another major
divergence between the two colonies is that while in Upper Canada,
"[c]ourts were notresorted to after 1828,"10 in Nova Scotia the second and
historically more important of the two proceedings did not take place until
1835-after the second, effective reform movement was well underway.
The fifteen years which elapsed between the seditious libel trials of
William Wilkie and Joseph Howe suggest that sedition proceedings in
Nova Scotia, unlike Upper Canada during the same period, were indeed
"isolated or extreme exceptions."" They signified the points at which
sedition crystallized in the government's mind as seditious libel, thanks
to the print medium, whether pamphlet or newspaper.
8. J.S Macdonald, comp., Annals [ofthe North British Society [ofl Halifax, Nova Scotia...
1768 [to] 1903 (Halifax: McAlpine Pub., 1905) at 37. To make matters worse, Loyalist
Solicitor-General Robie-he was elevated to the Council in 1824-was Speaker of the House
of Assembly, and therefore by implication himself an object of Wilkie's critique. Nor would
Wilkie have endeared himself to the solicitor-general by his gossipy, 'insider' comments on
the contested Speaker's election of 1819; see infra.
9. Supra note 7 at 24. The table excludes proceedings under the provincial Sedition Act. The
Nova Scotian cases also differ from the Upper Canadian in that the surviving documentation
includes no archival court records. Howe, unlike Wilkie, was stenographically reported; the
report was printed verbatim in Howe's newspaper, and then almost immediately thereafter
reprinted in small-book form. In neither instance, however, is the original court case file
extant-Halifax Supreme Court criminal records of any denomination are scarce between
1815 and 1850-and 'pleas of the crown' ceased to be entered in a separate record-book in
1804. Documentation of Wilkie is limited to contemporary newspaper accounts, chiefly the
government organ, the Nova Scotia Royal Gazette; see infra.
10. Supra note 7 at 24. This development nearly coincided with the ultimate repeal of Upper
Canada's Sedition Act.
11. ibid. at 8-9.
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The divergence between sedition in Upper Canada and sedition in
Nova Scotia was the cumulative effect of: Nova Scotia's proportionally
smaller immigrant population; less cross-border American influence; the
general absence from the relatively benign, paternalistic oligarchy, of the
psychopathology of "hysterical intolerance" and the paranoid siege
mentality generated by Upper Canada's collective trauma during the War
of 1812 (Nova Scotia scarcely suffered at all, but rather experienced an
economic boom through war profiteering); and Nova Scotia's evolving
and "accommodative political culture." 12 Indeed Nova Scotia was far
worse affected by the postwar recession, which created the climate of
economic hardship and uncertainty in which tradesmen, whose cause
William Wilkie philanthropically espoused, suffered the most. In other
respects, however, Wright's evocation of the "social pretensions and
political hegemony" of Upper Canada's 'Family Compact' in the 1820s
applies to Nova Scotia's ruling 6lite. Ideologically united by tory-
loyalism, both oligarchies
favoured a paternalism entailing a preoccupation with a stable social order
and a sensitivity to dissent.... [The oligarchy's] power derived from the
monopoly of government offices and patronage, facilitated by the colonial
structure of government administration. 3
The members of Nova Scotia's Council of Twelve were no less sensitive
to criticism, however justified, which they considered to be beneath their
collective dignity. The whiggish lawyer MHA, Thomas Chandler
Haliburton-born the same year as Wilkie-was to satirize the Council
12. P.A. Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government:BritishPolicyinBritishNorth
America, 1815-1850 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1985) at 237.
The legal culture of Nova Scotia was perhaps more conservative--certainly less accom-
modating-than the political culture. Whereas the attorney-general of Nova Scotia appeared
to have no difficulty obtaining from the grand jury on either occasion- Wilkie orHowe-atrue
bill on the indictment for seditious libel, his counterpart in Upper Canada was often compelled
to proceed by way of ex officio information, grand juries being sufficiently astute not to take
over-seriously "the substantial political use of criminal law": Wright, supra note 7 at 25. As
a prerogative prosecutorial instrument the ex officio criminal information did not need to be
resorted to in Nova Scotia in order to bypass the 'potential obstacle' posed by the grand jury,
which as a matter of course accepted indictments preferred by the crown on behalf of the
government. In other words, the very nature of the prosecution-public rather than private-
made returning a true bill more or less de rigueur. The role of the grand jury in such instances
was merely to conduct a pro forma preliminary inquiry and then to rubber-stamp the
indictment. Even more anomalous than the political role of the grand jury was the use in Nova
Scotia of special juries for criminal trials on indictment, which was an indirect consequence of
the fact that ex officio informations were almost entirely beyond the pale of Nova Scotia's
criminal procedure. Substantive jury reform did not take place until after Howe, in connection
with which the grand jury did what was expected of them; the special jury summoned to try the
accused, however, let the government down by finding Howe not guilty as charged.
13. Wright, supra note 7 at 29, 11.
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in 1827 as an ossified gerontocracy: "They consist of twelve dignified,
deep read, pensioned, old ladies... filled with prejudices and whims like
all other antiquated spinsters. They are the Sybilline oracles of Nova
Scotia.. .- 14 As Wright points out,15 the sedition prosecution was in-
tended not only to muzzle the critics, but also to discredit criticism by
stigmatizing it as subversive and by making an example of the critic
through condign punishment. For the purpose of instituting and success-
fully carrying through a sedition prosecution, moreover, it was very
convenient that the attorney-general and three out of four Supreme Court
judges were all members of the government.
Given its primacy and exceptionality in the Nova Scotian context,
Wilkie both exemplifies the judiciary's role in official repression, and
instantiates the importance of what Wright calls "the ideological mecha-
nisms of the criminal law" 16 in prescribing the outer limits of legitimate
political discourse. This paper examines the first known use by the
government of Nova Scotia of the eighteenth-century, judicially-in-
vented misdemeanour of seditious libel17 in order to silence and punish
criticism of the ruling 61ite. 1 As Nova Scotia had neither indigenous case-
law, nor statutory legislation to supplement and reinforce the common
law offence-Upper Canada's SeditionAct (1804) was still in full vigour,
despite unsuccessful attempts having been made to repeal it-the powers
that were in Halifax had to exploit to the full existing English case-law.
14. The Novascotian [Halifax] (29 March 1827) [Supplement], quoted in B. Cuthbertson,
The Old Attorney General: A Biography of Richard John Uniacke (Halifax: Nimbus, 1980) at
127. Like Wilkie before him, Haliburton was commenting on the Council's obstructive
behaviour in rejecting Assembly bills.
15. Supra note 7 at 13.
16. Ibid. at8.
17. Wright succinctly describes it as "an imported English judicial doctrine devised in the
eighteenth century to limit civil liberties flowing from the Revolution Settlement [ 1688]": ibid.
at 9-10.
18. Sutherland's characterization of the ruling clique as a 'merchantocracy' (supra note 3)
cannot be retrojected to the period preceding the collapse of the Loyalist Ascendancy in 1830,
except at the risk of anachronism. (The "Brandy Election" completed the triumph of the
mercantile 6ite over officialdom.) When the oligarchic Council was augmented from twelve
to fifteen members in 1832, the new accretions were all prominent merchants. At the time when
Wilkie's "seditious pamphlet" was written, however, the ratio of officials to merchants was
3 : 1. In addition to the chief justice (president, ex officio), there was the non-resident bishop
(ex officio), the treasurer, the attorney-general, the surveyor-general, the second puisnejudge
of the Supreme Court, the imperial collector of customs, the first puisne of the Supreme Court
[brother-in-law of the second, supra], the commissioner of H.M. Naval Dockyard and three
very substantial merchants (Charles Hill, John Black and James Fraser). In one case-
Treasurer Michael Wallace (quondam administrator of the government)-the senior official
was also a considerable merchant. In 1819, therefore, the government of Nova Scotia was far
from being a merchantocracy, though the process of its becoming one was admittedly
underway.
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To paraphrase Wright's summary, the sedition case of Wilkie illustrates
"the repressive uses of criminal law as well as the possibilities and limits
of counter-hegemonic struggles in the criminal courts. [It underlines] the
importance of the criminal law as a repressive social ordering mecha-
nism."19 Resorting in the first instance to criminal law was intended not
only to undermine, but also to 'delegitimize' public criticism of official
actions and institutions.
I. The Protagonist
Though Wilkie was speaking on behalf of others whom he viewed as an
oppressed minority in the political economy of Nova Scotia-"trades-
men" in general, and butchers in particular-it is fairly clear that he did
not himself belong to the class whose rights he had, with the condescend-
ing airs of the disinterested philanthropist, taken it upon himself to assert
and defend. In view of the fact that Wilkie had connections to the ruling
61ite through his brother-in-law, a prominent Halifax lawyer, one gets the
impression that he coveted entry into the oligarchy's "self-recruiting
corporation, the legal profession. '20
The family of William Wilkie were Anglo-Scottish 'old settlers' who
had neither participated in, nor directly benefited from, the Loyalist
Ascendancy. The family, whose origins were skewed by the Dictionary
of Canadian Biography,2' can in fact be reconstituted with a high degree
of probability. Wilkie's paternal grandparents, Dr James Wilkie and
Mary [nde Coltheart?]-formerly Mrs. James Roach [Roche] 22 -resided
at Annapolis Royal, where in 1765 James Wilkie was licensed to be the
schoolmaster and where, after her husband's suicide by poisoning in
1768, his widow ran a grocery store and rum shop. Mary Wilkie died in
1780, two years before the marriage, in Halifax, of her master mariner
son, Walter Coltheart Wilkie (ca. 1759-1844), to his former Annapolis
neighbour, Jane Rodda (1754-1847). These were theparents of the future
radical reformer and seditionist, who was born in Halifax in May 1796-
the youngest of six or seven siblings-and christened apparently in
19. Supranote7at 10.
20. Ibid. at 11.
21. Wilkie's father was not "descended from the pioneer [Halifax] settlers of 1749":
Sutherland, supra note 3 at 853.
22. Her posthumous grandson, William Henry Roach MHA (1784-1861), was to figure
prominently not only in William Wilkie's "seditious pamphlet" of 1820, but also in Joseph
Howe's self-defence to the charge of seditious libel in 1835: J.A. Chisholm, rev. & ed., The
Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe (Halifax: Chronicle Publishing Co., 1909) vol.
I at 47 et seq.
466 The Dalhousie Law Journal
honour of his paternal uncle, William, a shipmaster.23 Though William
Wilkie's occupation is not known, David Sutherland's inference from
Wilkie's vicarious defence of the economic rights of tradesmen that
Wilkie "belonged to and identified with the shopkeeper stratum of
Halifax society"'24 is groundless. Sutherland's later conclusion, however,
that Wilkie "received what was, for the time, an above-average education
and probably went to work as a clerk in a merchant counting-house"'25 is
possible, though the evidence-both internal and circumstantial-sug-
gests that he was probably a law clerk.
The pamphlet's substantive proposals for reforming the administra-
tion ofjustice suggest that Wilkie, whose brother-in-law was the influen-
tial Halifax barrister and placeman, David Shaw Clarke,'26 was (in today's
parlance) a paralegal. Not only his critical interest in the administration
of justice and advocacy of law reform,27 but also his knowledgeable
treatment of technical aspects of criminal procedure (such as nolle
prosequi) and his learned commentary on legal proceedings suggest that
23. The chief source of information about Wilkie family history is the commonplace-book
of Stephen Rodda (1715-post 1806), William Wilkie's maternal grandfather, who appears to
have spent his final years with his daughter and son-in-law Wilkie in Halifax: Canadian Parks
Service, Fort Anne National Historic Site, Annapolis Royal (mfm. at PANS). See also PANS
RG 1, vol. 165 [licence- and order-book] at 385, under date 1 August 1765; St. Paul's Church
lAng.] Halifax: marriage register, 10 December 1782, and baptismal register, 24 May 1796
(mfm. at PANS); W.A. Calnek, History of the County of Annapolis (Belleville, Ont, Mika
Studio, 1972 [repr. of 1897 ed.]) at 154, 156, 158, 580-81; A.E. Marble, comp., Deaths,
Burials, and Probate of Nova Scotians, 1749-1799, from Primary Sources (Halifax: Genea-
logical Association of Nova Scotia, 1990) vol. 2 at 130, 204: s.v. 'Wilkie, James', 'Wilkie,
Mary'. (I am grateful to Dr Marble, Associate Professor of Surgery at Dalhousie University,
for generously sharing with me the results of his research on surgeon James Wilkie.)
24. Supra note 3 at 853.
25. Ibid.
26. Clarke (1781-1850), who had married Wilkie's widowed sister Mrs. Jane Mary Bowlby,
in 1816, was so well regarded at Government House that he was appointed Herald for the
proclamation of King George IV at Halifax. This coincidence is enough to suggest the
possibility that Wilkie, who went out of his way to praise Lieutenant-Governor Lord
Dalhousie's conduct of affairs, thought that he could publish his criticisms of Court, Council
and Assembly while enjoying virtual immunity from public prosecution. Wilkie was conspicu-
ous in his support of the legislative initiatives of the lieutenant-governor, who was at
loggerheads with the Assembly over what he perceived to be their disrespectful attitude
towards the executive branch: Letter of Lord Dalhousie to S.B. Robie [Speaker] (13 April
1820), PANS MG 1, vol. 793, lib. iii, doc. 37 (Simon Bradstreet Robie fonds). As clerk of the
peace (secretary to the Court of Sessions), an office which he had held since as early as 1803
and which became hereditary in his family, David Shaw Clarke was the senior judicial
administrator for the District of Halifax. The Halifax town and district courts, in all of which
Clarke officiated as registrar, exercised both civil and criminal jurisdiction; see infra.
27. In this Wilkie diverged widely from Howe, who was more concerned with the magistrates
as a non-elective municipal council, so to speak, than as partial or incompetent administrators
of urban justice.
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Wilkie was by no means lacking in legal expertise. This assumption of
knowledge may well have been responsible for inducing Wilkie to ask to
be allowed to conduct his own defence.
II. The Alleged Libel
The spring of 1820-when William Wilkie was arrested, charged, held
without bail, tried, convicted and sentenced, for having published a
seditious libel "aspersing almost all the constituted Authorities in this
Country"-was a time of ferment in the politics of Nova Scotia. The death
in January of the old King George EII ended the nine-year Regency of the
profligate Prince of Wales and converted the prorogation of the legisla-
ture into a premature dissolution on 20 April, three days after Wilkie's
trial. The accession of the new King George IV was 'heralded' at Halifax
on 7 April by Wilkie's brother-in-law, lawyer Clarke, and Lieutenant-
Governor the Earl of Dalhousie-less than four years in the province-
was unexpectedly promoted governor-general of British North America.
Under such heightened circumstances the appearance in town, apparently
sometime between January and March 1820, of Wilkie's twenty-page
incendiary pamphlet, caused a tempest in the Halifax teacup.
Wilkie had undertaken that the Letter should "be published in a cheap
pamphlet, so as [sic] the poorer class may have an opportunity of
purchasing it; I therefore do not wish to swell it to a volume." He had also
"promised to a great many respectable individuals that this statement
should be as concise as possible and if I had acted otherwise I would have
basely betrayed the trust reposed in me by them."28 Wilkie was informed,
after his arrest, "that a large majority of the inhabitants of this town are
already deciding upon the merits of the" work.29 The pages are mis-
numbered, however, and the type so poorly composed that one is led to
suspect that the composition was done either in haste by an apprentice or
by an amateur. The sheets were obviously neither copy-edited nor
proofread. Two significant typographical errors occur in the cover title
28. Quoting pages 9 and 21 of A Letter to the People of Halifax, Containing Strictures on the
Conduct ofthe Magistrates with Regard to the Police Court, Court of QuarterSession[s], Work
House, Poor House, Jail, &c. Also Strictures On the Court of Commissioners, Supreme Court,
&c.; Also, Strictures on his Majesty's Council and House of Assembly, Bank Bill, Militia,
issuing Tickets for Flats [sic: Seats] Digby Election, raising thef[ri Pay, &c. &c. By a Nova-
Scotian (Halifax: Printed for the Author, 1820) [CIHM 67268]. A full bibliographic descrip-
tion with indispensable notes and references is given in P.L. Fleming, comp., Atlantic
Canadian hnprints, 1801-1820: A Bibliography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991)
at 138-39 [§ NS183].
29. Letter of W. Wilkie "To the People of the town of Halifax,"Acadian Recorder [Halifax]
(25 March 1820) at 3:6.
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itself. The occasional errors in orthography and grammar, for which the
author apologized profusely, are outnumbered by errors in typography;
clearly the work had been rushed into print. The newspaper publisher,
commercial printer and paper-miller-Anthony Henry Holland-to whom
production of the work has traditionally been ascribed, published (after
Wilkie's arrest, of course) a disclaimer alleging that the pamphlet had not
even been printed in Halifax.3" Though published most likely in the late
winter of 1820, "Wilkie's"-as the notorious imprint became known
locally-shows internal evidence of having been written in October 1819
at the earliest.31 Something of a precedent had been set earlier that year
by the publication of a treatise written under a nom de plume by a
disgruntled former country MHA, lawyer and would-be judge, John
George Marshall.32 The second half of Marshall's vengeful diatribe was
very critical of the entrenched mercantile interests, whom Marshall
blamed for retarding the province's socio-economic development and,
implicitly, for contributing to his defeat in the election of 1818 .33 No legal
proceedings were taken against Marshall, however, who carefully re-
frained from criticizing any level of government, and who returned to the
Assembly in the election of 1820, only to depart for the bench in 1823.
Unlike Marshall, who as the son of a prominent Loyalist was himself
part of the Ascendancy 61ite, Wilkie was not in the main concerned with
subversion and economic espionage by a cadre of leading merchants. His
Letter attempts chiefly to focus public attention on the maladministration
of justice, both criminal and civil, by the lay magistrates of Halifax's
district and township courts: the Police Court [criminal], the Commis-
sioners Court [civil] and the General Court of Quarter Sessions of the
Peace [criminal and civil]. The only tribunal left unscathed was the
district Inferior Court of Common Pleas [civil]. Wilkie adduces three
30. Acadian Recorder [Halifax] (25 March 1820) at 3.
31. "In the last Michaelmas term [1819] .. .", supra note 28 at 12.
32. Fleming, supra note 28 at 129 [§ NS160].
33. Sutherland, supra note 3 at 116-17. Sutherland sees Wilkie's pamphlet [which was
published in 1820 not 1819, as stated at 117] as expressing "in even more passionate terms"
the "outrage" articulated by lawyer Marshall in his "radical," anti-merchant "diatribe" of the
previous year. Marshall, to whom Sutherland grants far more credit (and credibility) than he
deserves, was an intending placeman concerned chiefly with reactivating his career in electoral
politics. He had nothing to say about the maladministration of urban justice or the desirability
of procedural or institutional law reform; his own urban law practice was far too lucrative for
him to be anything other than a reflex establishmentarian. The reform agenda was exclusive
to the inarticulate victims of the systemic status quo-or their spokesmen, such as Wilkie-
not its lawyer-profiteers. Marshall was a sanctimonious, self-pitying whinger, who feared
(unnecessarily, as it turned out) that the custom of sexennial legislatures would defer his return
to the Assembly until 1824. There seems little justification for comparing Marshall with
Wilkie, a free-thinking radical reformer whose motives were as disinterested as his ideas were
dangerous to express.
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separate proceedings in support of his arguments, one criminal prosecu-
tion apiece in the Quarter Sessions and the Supreme Court, respectively,
and one private action for debt in the Supreme Court.34 The pamphlet also
furnishes an interesting and important commentary on the first of the only
two sessions of the Eleventh Assembly, which convened in February
1819 and was dissolved in April 1820. Nor is the pamphlet lacking the
author's peculiar autograph: Wilkie's diatribe against the Assembly's
rejection of the medical practitioner's bill,35 as well as his metaphorical
use of the motif of death by poison, 36 are clear allusions to his paternal
grandfather, the Annapolis surgeon-schoolmaster, who killed himself in
a fit of alcohol-induced depression over debt, twenty-eight years before
William Wilkie was born.
Wilkie commenced his institutional critique of the administration of
urban justice with the Police Court, ultimate progenitor of today's
Provincial Court, which was presided over by the custos rotulorum [chief
magistrate] of the District of Halifax.37 Wilkie's chief objection was to the
exorbitant salary paid the clerk of the court, David Shaw Clarke-
Wilkie's brother-in-law-an 'establishmentarian' who made a very good
living as Halifax's de facto municipal clerk-cum-solicitor. Perhaps this
accounts for Thomas Beamish Akins's memory of Clarke as "the most
corpulent man in town. ' 3 As clerk of the peace [secretary to the Court of
34. The first two cases are identified; the third probably could not have been, without
incurring the risk of criminal defamation, because it involved lawyer Clarke as defendant.
Having doubtless antagonized his influential brother-in-law by the pointedness of his criticism,
Wilkie perhaps did not want to add insult to injury by publicly embarrassing his own sister, Mrs
Jane Mary Bowlby Clarke, nde Wilkie.
35. Supra note 28 at 17.
36. Ibid. at 7, 14.
37. The chief magistrate of Halifax was John George Pyke CR (ca. 1743-1828), who had
been ajustice of the peace since 1777, and who had assumed the office of"custos of the County"
about 1806, on the retirement of his even longer-lived predecessor, John Newton: A. Robb,
"Pyke, John George," DCB, vol. 6 at 621-22. The Governor in Council appointed the custos
rotulorun, who in turn appointed the clerk of the peace. The custos, who had precedence of the
first justice of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas, the offices having formerly been combined,
simultaneously served as ex officio president of the Court of Quarter Sessions. For the office
of custos rotulorun, see Murdoch, infra note 45, vol. 1 at 133.
38. Akins, supra note I at 207. Akins also stated that "No man was better known or more
popular for about thirty years in Halifax than David Shaw Clarke." Perhaps it was Clarke's very
popularity which was instrumental in Wilkie's downfall. "The duties of Mr Clarke are to attend
dally at the Police office-to take all examination relative to assaults, Felonies and other
business brought before the Magistrates to fill up the various Bonds Sums to Keep Books of
records-and whatever is required in the office": 'Names of Police officers / Their duties /
Amount of Income and Fees / How derived' [1839]: PANS RG 34-312 series J, file 11 [draft;
printed in theJournal of the Legislative Council, 1840, Appendix No. 36 at79]. In 1841 Clarke
was to carry into retirement as a lifelong annuity his £300 salary as clerk of police, the office
of police magistrate having been abolished by the Town of Halifax Incorporation Act.
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Sessions], which office he had held at least since 1803, lawyer Clarke
served as ex officio registrar of all the magisterial courts. Not until after
the anti-magistrate verdict in Howe was any attempt made to involve
lawyers directly in the administration of urban justice; previously they
were mere judicial administrators (registrars, clerks, etc.) rather than
equal or sole judges.3 9 Having begun by criticizing the administration of
justice in a municipal court, Wilkie immediately broadened the scope of
his attack to address the maladministration of municipal government by
the magistrates collectively, whom he accused (inter alia) of "illegal
imprisonment." The Bridewell (alias House of Correction), to which
Wilkie himself would afterwards be sentenced, was allegedly being used
by the magistrates as a reformatory for detaining public nuisances and
social outcasts, rather than as a correctional centre for housing petty
offenders serving custodial sentences. 40
The next tribunal to come within Wilkie's purview was the Quarter
Sessions, which was also presided over by the aged 'custos of the county.'
In order to illustrate vividly the inconsistency and partiality of the
magistrates, Wilkie adduced the case of R. v. Caton [sic: Keating] et al.,
for common assault, which had come before the Sessions at their last
September term (1819). The three accused were all found guilty; the one
who was sentenced to pay a fine, not having the wherewithal, was
39. A momentous change occurred in 1835, indirectly as a result of the acquittal of Howe,
when the then custos, James Foreman (who had tendered his resignation previous to the
sedition trial) was replaced by lawyer William Quincy Sawers, who was chief justice of the
Eastern Division of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas and president of the Court of Sessions.
Sawers's duties included a "general superintendence of all the municipal affairs & public
institutions, the sole management of the Bridewell, the trial of all causes in the Sessions &
Police & under the Statutes which give jurisdiction to magistrates in certain cases.. .": supra
note 38. This step represented the first attempt to integrate the administration of urban justice
into the wider municipal court system; see P. Girard, "The Rise and Fall of Urban Justice in
Halifax, 1815-1886" (1988) 8:2 Nova Scotia Historical Review, at 57 passim.
40. Concerning Bridewell, which was established by act of the legislature in 1815 for the
accommodation of vagrants and disorderly persons convicted and sentenced in the Police
Office, and which was placed under the direct control of the Court of Sessions, see Akins, supra
note 1 at 166. Wilkie's views on the purpose and function of this penal institution were years
ahead of their time.
It can be difficult to distinguish between Bridewell and the Workhouse, which had existed
since 1759; in North American (as opposed to British) usage, which Akins appears to be
following, the latter might also mean a correctional centre for petty offenders. That the County
Bridewell became a political football during the course of the 1819 session of the legislature
is suggested by the fact that Pyke CR and the other Halifax magistrates petitioned for provincial
relief from the oppressive municipal tax burden which they had had to impose in order to
support the institution; their initiative led to the appointment of a select committee: Journal of
the House of Assembly [hereinafter JHA] (24 February & 25 March 1819). The only material
result, however, seems to have been that at the session of 1820 MHAs voted to continue the
quinquennial Act for establishing a Bridewell.
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committed as if to debtor's prison at the instance of ajudgment creditor.
One of the two who had been given a custodial sentence purchased his
liberty through greasing the magisterial palm; the consideration was less
than half the stipulated fine ultimately paid by Keating. 1
Wilkie then proceeded to condemn the sessional administration of the
workhouse; he candidly admitted the virtual impossibility of obtaining
legal redress against those magisterial peculators, who "coercively plun-
dered the pockets of the laborious labourer."42 Wilkie was no less aware
than any legally conversant Upper Canadian radical of the potentially
unlimited use by the law officers of the device of nolle prosequi to stay
private prosecutions embarrassing to the government-in other words,
the magistrates "acting under commissions from the Executive author-
ity": "a more subtle measure because the political reasons for terminating
the case were easily obscured."43 The second penal institution subject to
Willdie's critique of the abuse of magisterial authority was the County
Jail, concerning which he flatly accused the magistrates of the misappro-
priation of public funds; but he was able to adduce only hearsay evidence.
44
The third tribunal coming within the purview of Wilkie's critique of
the administration of urban justice was the Court of Commissioners,
which Wilkie rather exaggeratedly depicted as a microcosm of the
infamous Tudor-Stuart High Commission Court.45 He dwelt on the
41. Wilkie's probable source of information was his older brother James Charles William
(supra note 2), who was deputizing for the clerk of the peace, lawyer Clarke: "Cashins fine was
paid to Mr Pyke he paid it to the County Treasurer on the 22 Sept. The Clk of the Peace was
indisposed & Mr James Wilkie acted for him": PANS RG 34-312 series P vol. 9: 'Minutes of
the / Court of / Quarter Sessions / Halifax County / Dec 1814 to Dec 20 1820. / at 203
[marginalium].
42. Supra note 28 at 7.
43. Wright, supra note 7 at 51. "Nay, I will go further," declaimed Wilkie. "I will so punish
them [the magistrates], that they themselves shall acknowledge in their hours of tribulation,
that tho' a nolleprosequi might have screened them from the bar ofjustice... : supra note 28
at 8, 7. Wilkie cast himself as Nemesis in order to see justice done to both the petit bourgeois
and the working-class victims of oppressive municipal taxation and the maladministration of
urban justice.
44. Supra note 28 at 8.
45. The High Commission was a prerogative "court of ecclesiasticaljurisdiction, established
and united to the regal power by the Act ofSupremacy 1588.... [T]he High Commission Court
exercised extraordinary and despotic powers of fine and imprisonment. Nor did it confine its
jurisdiction altogether to cases of spiritual cognisance. For these reasons the Court was
abolished in 1640. James I afterwards attempted to revive it, but it was finally declared illegal
by the Bill of Rights 1688": E.R.H. Ivamy, ed., Mozley & Whiteley's Law Dictionary, 1Oth ed.
(London: Butterworths 1988) at 218. (The High Commission is not to be confused with the
Court of Star Chamber, which was also abolished by the Habeas Corpus Act, 1640.) Wilkie's
analogy is more apparent than real, for the HCC was a superior court of criminal jurisdiction,
while the Commissioners Court was "a court for the summary trial of actions"-a small claims
court-unique to Halifax township. It had been established by act of the legislature in 1817,
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difficulty of poor people obtaining equal or natural civil justice, regard-
less of whether they had "good and sufficient cause of action." Again
Wilkie honed his argument by reference to a particular action-alas both
unidentified and unidentifiable-in which a miscarriage of justice was
alleged to have occurred. The commissioners numbered five, two of
whom were magistrates. Wilkie was not in favour of abolishing the court,
but of septupling the number of commissioners. Though Wilkie con-
ceived the justices more as arbitrators than as judges, he seems to have
been unaware that the route of appeal or rehearing lay from the Commis-
sioners Court directly to the Supreme Court.
At this point Wilkie temporarily suspended his critique of the munici-
pal courts in order to launch a defamatory personal attack on the
progressive merchant John Albro, MHA for Halifax township and a pillar
of the mercantile establishment. Wilkie did not name Albro but describes
him so accurately that his identity is unmistakable.46 Albro, who had
entered the Assembly at the general election of 1818, was damned
alliteratively by Wilkie for "[p]rostituting the principles he professed
previous to his election."47 While Albro's biographer, Allan Dunlop, 4
suggests that Albro's "career in the House of Assembly was not spectacu-
lar, for he was no more than a faithful supporter of measures pursued by
the Halifax business 6lite," Wilkie took the view that Albro ("a prosti-
tuted member of theHouse of Assembly, &c.") was virulently corrupt and
hypocritical, and chiefly responsible for those oppressive municipal tax
increases required to finance the members' increasing their "sessional
indemnity" by two-thirds. Wilkie could scarcely have used stronger
language to deliver his execration of John Albro. It is possible, moreover,
that his 'strictures' against the honourable member for Halifax were taken
seriously by the freeholders of the township, for Dunlop discovered
evidence of prognostications that Albro would be beaten in the snap
election of 1820. Albro's Assembly colleague, lawyer and intending
banker, Henry Hezekiah Cogswell, stood down and Albro himself was
about two years after the Police Office: B. Murdoch, Epitome of the Laws of Nova-Scotia
(Halifax: J. Howe, 1832-33)vol. 3 at 63-64. The statutory creation of these tribunals, the
former civil the latter criminal, both of which were staffed by lay magistrates, resulted from the
government's attempt to reform and regularize (but not to professionalize!) the administration
of urban justice in Halifax.
46. Supra note 28 at 11; the attack is reprised, with no less violence, at 19. Concerning Albro,
see A.C. Dunlop, "Albro, John," DCB, vol. 7 at 12-13. A long-time Halifax magistrate,
towards the end of his life Albro would be one of the Twelve Magistrates signing the formal
complaint to the lieutenant-governor which led to the prosecution of Joseph Howe for seditious
libel.
47. Ibid.
48. Supra note 46.
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finally defeated at the general election of 1826 by another young lawyer-
politician 'on the make'-Beamish Murdoch. In 1820, however, despite
Wilkie's best efforts to assassinate his character and destroy him politi-
cally, Albro led the poll in town.
Wilkie next reprised the theme of law reform by drawing the attention
of his readers "to a defect in ourjudicial proceedings": capital punishment
as a penal sanction for burglary. Wilkie argued that though the sentence
was imposed it was no longer carried out, and ought therefore to be
expunged from the statute-book as a dead letter.49 Wilkie' s complaint that
convicted burglars were set at liberty rather than executed is borne out by
the case of Sampson Fox (Pictou, 1817), who was ordered released
despite having been convicted of burglary and sentenced to death. 0
While he was "upon the subject of jurisprudence," Wilkie proceeded
to address "an evil which exists in our supreme court, which calls loudly
for redress. That is the numerous special juries summoned every term,
which ... interrupts the justice of the country."'" By moving for the
empanelment of a special jury, arranging for one or more of the twelve not
to appear, and then declining to complete the number by writ of tales, both
criminal and civil defence counsel who were unable or unwilling to go to
trial, could procure vexatious continuances. Special juries were autho-
rized by the English statute-(1730) 3 Geo. 2, c. 25, s. 15-which was
construed as applying to criminal indictments for misdemeanour, such as
assault and battery and sedition. The provincial act-(1796) 36 Geo. 3,
c. 2, s. 6-enlarged on its imperial prototype by providing for special
juries in any criminal or civil proceeding in the Supreme Court.5 2 In
support of his argument Wilkie adduced the cause cjlkbre, Sterling v.
Hoffinan (Michaelmas 1819), which was defended by James William
Johnston; attorney and counsel for the plaintiff were William Quincy
Sawers (the future custos) and Archibald KC.53 After "retiring for a
number of hours," wrote Wilkie,
49. Supra note 28 at 11.
50. PANS RG 1, vol. 173 at 403 [notice to sheriff].
51. Supra note 28 at 11-12.
52. Murdoch, supra, note 45 at 3:175-78. Wilkie's stricture that the prospective foreman of
the specialjury in Stirling v. Hoffinann had had to travel twenty miles to attend court in Halifax
(supra note 28 at 12) was addressed by an act of 1827, which waived the obligation unless the
prospective juror lived within fifteen miles of town: ibid., vol. 3 at 176. Wilde shows himself
better acquainted with the civil procedure rule (Easter 1782), according to which "any party
wishing a special jury must move for it on the first day of the term," than with the act of 1796,
which "made it imperative to direct a tales, wherever an incomplete jury appeared": ibid., vol.
3 at 177 and note.
53. PANS RG 39 "'' vol. 104, at 551b, under date 29 Dec. 1818 ['Original Entries']; v. 121
at 148, under date 14 Oct. 1819 [minutes of proceedings]. The case file is not extant. The action
was for exemplary damages (£500) for assault and battery. It originated in a quarrel, attempted
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this jury returned with a verdict, 'If the parties will agree to pay each of
them half of the expences, attending this suit, then we have come to a
decision.' This of course could not be recorded. The Judges [Blowers CJ,
Halliburton and Stewart JJ] laughed at their ignorance; the lawyers
grumbled at their presumption; and the audience swore at their demerits,
insignificance and deceit. This judicial farce ended by one of the jury
fainting when they were all dismissed, to the entire satisfaction ofjudges,
lawyers and audience. Now does not this prove the futility of summoning
special juries? Did any petit jury ever offer, or attempt to form such a
stupid, disgraceful and ignorant verdict?54
The official court record states simply that the suit was extinguished
upon the withdrawal of ajurorby consent of parties. No doubt the defence
stratagem of which Wilkie complains had been used to procure continu-
ances from Hilary to Easter to Trinity to Michaelmas Term 1819. It is
certainly ironic that among Wilkie's law reform proposals was the
abolition of special juries, by which he probably-and Howe certainly ---
were both to be tried. In Howe a prospective juror was allowed to stand
down because he was a magistrate and therefore interested in the
prosecution. On that occasion, however, Attorney-General Archibald (as
he had since become) did not hesitate to move for a writ of tales so that
the trial could proceed.55
Having concluded his critique of the administration of justice with a
vivid 'life study' of civil litigation in the Supreme Court, Wilkie moved
on to consider the conduct of the two divisions making up the legislative
branch of government: Council and Assembly. Again he applied the
heuristic method, drawing on the 1819 session for materials with which
to construct his argument. With regard to Wilkie' s animadversions on the
Council, it must be carefully noted that he was criticizing the Council not
in its executive but in its legislative capacity and character, and that the
three judges who sat for his trial were all active and influential members
horsewhipping and threatened duel involving two prominent Halifax ex-Navy surgeons, who
later became close collaborators: Matthias Francis Hoffmann [DCB, vol. 8 at 398-400] and
John Stirling. Related to what Dr Hoffmann doubtless perceived as vexatious litigation by his
professional rival was the malicious prosecution by Hoffmann of Dr Stirling's lawyer, William
Quincy Sawers, whose brother-Alexander Fraser Sawers-was another prominent physi-
cian, for having allegedly assaulted Hoffmann: I. Longworth, Life of S. G. V. Archibald
(Halifax: S.F. Heustis, 1881) at 22-25. R. v. Sawers, in which Solicitor-General Robie
appeared for the crown and Archibald KC for the accused, resulted in an acquittal.
54. Supra note 28 at 12.
55. Chisholm, supra note 22 vol. I at 24. He could not enter a nolle prosequi, which in any
case would only have stayed the proceedings rather than withdrawing the charge. Failing to
move for a tales, which in any case was contrary to the statute, would have rendered the trial
nugatory. Even otherwise it would have been an impossible course for the attorney-general to
follow, as Howe (like Wilkie before it) was a public prosecution approved and ordered by
government, not a private prosecution discountenanced by government.
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of Council. As objects of Wilkie' s criticism in their legislative capacity,
therefore, Chief Justice Blowers (president, ex officio), no less than
Justices Halliburton and Stewart, could scarcely have been impartial
towards Wilkie when he came before them accused of seditious libel.
"This council," wrote Wilkie, ironizing with faint praise, "is composed
of twelve of the most respectable and honest inhabitants of Halifax; but
I intend to argue, that they are also too wealthy."56 Having declared in
favour of a legislative council separate from the executive-a constitu-
tional reform not implemented in Nova Scotia until 1837-8-Wilkie
proceeded to rehearse the failure of the Halifax Bank Incorporation Bill,
which was agreed to by the Assembly but rejected by the Council.57
Though he deplores the failure of such a progressive economic measure
as the incorporation of a commercial bank, Wilkie misunderstands the
pretext for the Council's refusal to agree, which was not only an act of cut-
throat competition among Council businessmen, but also a belated quid
pro quo: in 1801 the Assembly had rejected a bill "to incorporate the
Subscribers to the Bank of Nova Scotia."5 The memory of this defeat still
rankled in the minds of those councillors who had been among the
prospective incorporators and subscribers of the original bank.
So distressed was Wilkie by the political infighting which led to the
final defeat of the Bank Incorporation Bill that he went so far as to advise
the lieutenant-governor to consider dismissing those members of Council
56. Supra note 28 at 13.
57. "A Bill intitled An Act to authorize the Incorporation of the Subscribers to a Bank at
Halifax[AnAct to authorize the Establishment ofa Bank atHalifaxj"lBill No. 19: PANS RG
5 "U" [Unpassed bills] box 6 (1818-1819). "I have read the bill, that passed through the
House": ibid. One wonders how Wilkie could have got hold of a copy of an unenacted law;
legislative bills were usually not printed until they had passed both Houses and received
viceregal assent; perhaps his cousin Roach, whom he feigned not to know, was the interme-
diary.
58. JHA, 1801 at 4, 6, 10; Akins, supra note I at 133; Murdoch, supra note 2 at 205; Letter
of J. Wentworth to S. Bernard (10 April 1801): PANS RG 1, vol. 53, at 203. A further attempt
was made in 1811, sponsored by the Halifax Committee of Trade: Murdoch, ibid., 308. Among
the provisional directors of the first, stillborn Scotiabank was the merchant James Fraser, who
about 1810 (after a successful career in commerce and politics in New Brunswick) had
removed to his former domicile-Halifax-and in 1818 had been appointed to the Council of
Nova Scotia. Complicating the Council's rejection of the 1819 Assembly bill, moreover, was
the fact that Fraser, who had been involved in both previous failed promotions (1801 and 1811),
was also the principal prospective incorporator of the new bank. One can only attribute the
failure of the bill to the influence of Fraser's business competitors within and outside the
Council, which in 1819 was still very far from being a homogeneous merchantocracy.
"But they [the Council] tell us they rejected the bill, on the representations of some very
respectable merchants": Wilkie, supra note 28 at 13. On "the conflict and compromise of the
session in 1819," see especially J.S. Martell, A Documentaty Study of Provincial Finance and
Currencv 1812-36 (Halifax: PANS, 1941) at 10-11.
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who had opposed it.59 Wilkie also lamented the fact that legislative
sessions of the Council were not open to the public-nor were their
journals printed until 1838-so that Council debates could not be
reported in the newspapers, and it was therefore impossible to determine
which of the Twelve were traitors to the banldess people of Nova Scotia.
The ad hoc legislative council was nothing more than the executive
council very ineffectively disguised, a constitutional anomaly which
permitted judges to function in all three branches of government. In
Upper and Lower Canada, on the other hand, the executive and legislative
councils had been separated at birth.
However annoyed Wilkie may have been that the legislative sessions
of Council were conducted in camera, he was incensed by the Assembly's
attempt to regulate admission to the front seats in the gallery of the new
Province Building by issuing tickets. Wilkie's lament on behalf of "[o]ne
of our citizens [the dry goods merchant Alexander Izat]," who
for his temerity to gain admission into the front seat, was by these truly
faithful representatives sent to jail, until he should with bended knees, and
uplifted hands, implore their forgiveness. This he refused to do and glad
am I of it; for they discharged him without [his] submitting, to so servile
and ignominious a homage.'
Wilkie concludes his account of the incident by describing himself as
having "watched the proceedings of the House of Assembly with a
vestal's vigilance," though not perhaps from a front seat in the gallery.
Moving from the gallery to the floor of the House, Wilkie proceeded
to criticize the Assembly's conduct of the Digby Township disputed
election. His vigorous advocacy of the cause of a wronged relative,
William Henry Roach MHA,6 1 suggests that Wilkie had access to detailed
59. Wilkie overlooked the protocol that the lieutenant-governor (for obvious reasons) did not
attend legislative sessions of the Council, and that Council votes were not recorded. Very little
could be inferred from a prosopography of those ten members of Council who happened to be
in attendance the day the bill was considered in committee of the whole and voted down: JLC,
3 Apr. 1819: PANS RG 1, vol. 218"'.
60. Supra note 28 at 14-15. Wilkie refers to an incident which took place on 3 March 1819,
when "[t]he house arrested a person for contempt committed in their presence. He was sitting
in the gallery, which then ran round three sides of the room, and spoke aloud in terms offensive
to a member [John Albro?]. He remained in jail until 25 March, when the house ordered his
discharge": Murdoch, supra note 2 at 436; JHA (3 and 25 March 1819); Acadian Recorder
[Halifax] (20 March 1819) at 2. Cf. "No instance has been known in this province, of the
Council arresting any person forcontemptoftheirHouse, though theLowerHouse [Assembly]
has often done so": Murdoch, supra note 45, vol. 1 at 67.
61. Mrs Mary Roach Wilkie (d. 1780), who had been twice married and widowed, was their
paternal grandmother. As a Halifax magistrate Roach was to sign the joint declaration against
Joseph Howe in 1835, and (as then acting chief commissioner of Bridewell) was also to be
Howe's bete noire during the sedition trial defence: Chisholm, supra note 22, at 1:47 et seq.
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inside information. His coyness about his blood relation rings perhaps a
little hollow: "A gentleman of the name of Wm. H. Roach .... "62Wilkie
attributed the election 'trial,' which claimed much of the Assembly's
attention during the session of 1819, to malice on the part of lawyer
Thomas Ritchie, MHA for Annapolis County, whom Roach declined to
support in the contested Speaker's election against the incumbent,
Solicitor-General Robie, earlier the same year. Roach's seat was ordered
vacated but he was returned in May 1819, "after a long and severe[ly]
contested election," 63 only to take his seat a mere two months before the
legislature was dissolved and he had to face the voters again for the third
time in two years. In Wilkie' s spirited defence of his cousin it is difficult
not to see him defending the family honour.64
Wilkie saw the politics of interpersonal rivalry raise its ugly head not
only in the Digby Township controverted election, but also in the
Assembly's contemptuous rejection of the Lieutenant-Governor's plan
for renewing the militia establishment. Wilkie viewed a well-regulated
provincial militia as being a counterweight to, as well as obviating the
necessity for, the British army garrison, which he apprehended as a
potential instrument of tyranny and oppression: "We have a numerous
standing force always at hand, and we do not know how soon they may
be called upon to annihilate our rights and liberties, especially when we
consider the complexions of their characters."'65 Worse still was the
Assembly's deferral of the bill to regulate medical practitioners, 66 as a
result of which Wilkie feared an infestation of barber-surgeons. The
Concerning the disputed election for Digby Township see B. Cuthbertson, Johnny Bluenose
at the Polls: Epic Nova Scotian Election Battles 1758-1848 (Halifax: Formac, 1994) 140-41.
62. Supra note 28 at 15.
63. Ibid. at 16.
64. Concerning Roach's distinguished career in politics see Calnek, supra note 23 at 409-12.
It is of comparative interest that Roach, like Wilkie himself, made his name as a law reformer,
whereas lawyer MHAs such as Ritchie were extreme Tories preoccupied by the quest for
preferment. Being on the wrong side not so much of politics as of Joseph Howe, nevertheless,
Roach-a progressive and independent liberal-was written out of whig triumphalist history
and omitted from the Reform pantheon in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography.
65. Wilkie, supra note 28 at 16-17. The irony was loston Wilie thatthe lieutenant-governor,
of whom he appears to have thought so highly, was a lieutenant-general on the active service
list who had served under Wellington in the Peninsula, and (as a matter of wartime imperial
policy sustained in the postwar period) united in himself the civil and military commands.
66. Bill No. 24, "An Act to ascertain the qualifications of Persons practising as Physicians,
surgeons and apothecaries in this province and to regulate the practice of the same": PANS
RG 5 "U" box 6 (1818-1819); JI-IA (1819) at 58, 59, 64; Wilkie, supra note 28 at 17. Allan
Marble points out that the bill was in response to a petition from the medical doctors in Halifax:
A.E. Marble, Surgeons, Smallpox and the Poor: A History of Medicine and Social Conditions
in Nova Scotia, 1749-1799 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), at 167. The
regulatory bill did not pass until 1828; unsurprisingly, an amendment the following year
introduced a grandfather clause.
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doctors proved almost as resistant to statutory regulation as the legal
profession ten years before. Having been regulated themselves since
1811, however, the lawyers were now keen to subject the doctors to a similar
regimen: the bill was introduced in the Assembly by Archibald KC.
Worst of all was the hyperinflationary attempt by MHAs to raise their
honorarium by two-thirds, at a time of economic stasis induced by the
continuing postwar depression: public indebtedness as well as "a dimin-
ished revenue, exorbitant taxes, an enormous civil list of upwards of
160001.! ' '67 Wilkie approved the course of action adopted by governor
and council in not rejecting the Appropriation Act, which could not be
amended except by the Assembly, where it originated; such a course
would have deprived the province of supply and provoked yet another
constitutional crisis. Wilkie went so far as to propose turning constitu-
tional convention on its ear by having money bills originate in the
Council, rather than in the Assembly." He ominously warns his readers
against the consequences of taxation without equal representation, im-
plicitly comparing the situation of Nova Scotian taxpayers relative to an
electorally unrepresentative House of Assembly, with that of the Thirteen
Colonies relative to Parliament before the American Revolution.69 Politi-
cally, it is clear that Wilkie was a believer in enlightened despotism or
benign, paternalistic tyranny. He was not so much a tory democrat as an
anti-democrat since he had even less confidence in representative gov-
ernment than he had in oligarchy. Moreover, the notion of Responsible
Government was anathema to his political economy. The only official in
whom he seems to have had unfettered confidence was the Earl of
Dalhousie, whose side he very conspicuously took in the lieutenant-
governor's political struggle with the lawyers who led the Assembly.
Democracy for Wilkie meant rule by faction; it was the anarchic alterna-
tive to constitutional government under the aegis of the imperium. In
general Wilkie viewed representative government, as it had existed in
Nova Scotia since '1756' [sic], as positively antithetical to peace, order
and good government. Representative government could only be justi-
fied under a meritocracy, which was the principle of sociopolitical
organization to which Wilkie adhered and which he desired to introduce
in Nova Scotia. His zeal for radical reform suggests that Wilkie was a
utopian socialist, not a social democrat, but whether of the extreme Right
or the extreme Left is difficult to tell. At all events, Wilkie was a radical
reformer in polar opposition to the 'conservative reformers' of the 1830s
67. Supra note 28 at 17-19.
68. Ibid. at 20.
69. Ibid. at 19-20.
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and 1840s, whose efforts resulted in the achievement of Responsible [i.e.,
party political] Government in 1848. He presciently forecast that gov-
ernment "will be transferred into the hands of the Representatives of the
people, and then we will be governed by a democratic faction, in direct
contradiction to the principles of our invaluable constitution."70 It is little
wonder that Howe (an instinctive conservative-Murray Beck's familiar
'mild tory'-who gradually became a conservative reformer and never
became a radical reformer) did not view Wilkie as his 'forerunner.' As
real or imagined reformers, they were running at unequal speed in
different directions.
Wilkie concludes his "strictures" with a page-and-a-half of after-
thoughts (General Remarks), which he devotes chiefly to reprising his
attack on fat lawyer Clarke, this time in his capacity as clerk of the
Commissioners Court.71 Wilkie accused Clarke of having
had the confidence or impudence.., to defend an action brought against
him in the supreme court, brought by a printer [Anthony Henry Holland],
for the amount of printing summonses &c. for that court. Now his defence
was, that the printer ought to obtain the amount of his demand from the
grand jury; pretty language this, that the public should pay for these very
writs, that he receives for each 2s. 6d. or 3s. 9d. yet this doctrine was forced;
but judges and jury gave it a decided negative. Here then we see what
would be done, if the powers of the magistrates was [sic] exerted without
controul. 2
70. Ibid. at 18.
71. Ibid.at[21].
72. Hollandv. Clarke (S.C. 1819): PANS RG 39 "C" [HX] box 143 (1818)-case file; cf.RG
39 'T' [HX] vol. 121 at 92-minutes of proceedings; the judgment per se was not recorded.
The professional colleague who had the "confidence or impudence" to conduct Clarke's
defence to the action was William Quincy Sawers, the future custos of Halifax; counsel for the
plaintiff was Archibald KC. To some extent the concept of judicial review of the Court of
Sessions acting in its judicial capacity already existed, for criminal proceedings could be and
often were removed by certiorari from the Quarter Sessions to the Supreme Court. Judicial
oversight of the lay magistrates courts did not become judicial superintendence until 1835,
when a sitting judge [Sawers] was appointed to preside in the courts of the District of Halifax,
their having been expressly excluded from the EqualAdministration of Justice Act, (1824) 4
& 5 Geo. 4, c. 38; this act provided that divisional first justices would have to be barristers of
at least ten years' standing and continuous practice.
Wilkie, the gadfly, would have been apoplectic if he had survived long enough to see the
legislature in 1824 add three morejudges to the provincial establishment at a cost off1200 per
annum, thus providing comfortable berths for three lawyer-MHAs: J.I. Chipman, T. Ritchie
and W.H.O. Haliburton KC [father of the novelist]. A fourth lawyer-MHA, J.G. Marshall
(supra note 33), had already been looked after the previous year through being awarded a
judicial suzerainty over the whole of Cape Breton Island. Whereas lawyer-critics of the
mercantile 61ite, such as Marshall, were willingly silenced by means of judgeships, lower-
middle-class critics of the Establishment, such as Willie, were prosecuted forcrime against the
state. Chief among the manifestations of the repressive nature and unequal administration of
criminal justice was the 'incontestable illegality' of sedition.
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Wilkie here tosses off the rather serious implication that the Court of
Session, in yet another of its judicial incarnations,73 was permitting the
clerk of the peace, its senior administrative officer, to indulge in vexatious
litigation in order to square accounts with the grand jury, which had no
power whatever directly to disburse funds.
Wilkie, who may perhaps not have been sensible to the dangers of a
criminal prosecution, either private or public, attempted to avoid action-
able defamation by not naming either of the individuals-Clarke and
Albro-whom he had libelled, while describing them in such a manner
as to render them all too easily identifiable. In this regard Wilkie perhaps
obtained a pyrrhic victory, though he grossly miscalculated the odds
against his being prosecuted by the government for seditious libel.
Perhaps the 'worst case scenario' he had envisaged was a private
prosecution for defamatory libel, to which his confrere, the "Whig
Radical" dry goods merchant, Thomas Forrester (1790-1841), would be
subjected by tory merchant-magistrates in 1825.74 If Wilkie presumed to
capitalize on relationship-by-marriage to the extent of denouncing As-
cendancy office-holders, such as lawyer Clarke, and trying to exploit his
family connections with them in order to ensure immunity from prosecu-
tion, then pride went before his fall.
Ill. R. v. Wilkie
Unlike William Wilkie, the self-professed author (and de facto pub-
lisher), Anthony Henry Holland-the putative printer-was able to
escape the legal consequences of his action by publicly disavowing it in
the same issue of his newspaper which carried Wilkie's righteously
indignant letter from prison.' 5 Holland was also able to lend the colour of
credibility to his denial through the fact that the title-page of the pamphlet
indicatedfor whom-not by whom-it had been printed. In other words,
it had been privately published-a material fact in libel, where "it is the
publication which constitutes the offence. '7 6 Holland had reason to be
concerned. He had already attracted some hostile attention for both
publishing and widely advertising and disseminating lawyer Marshall's
pamphlet, almost exactly a year before Wilkie's. No one, however-
73. In fact only two of the five commissioners appear to have been JPs at the time.
74. See D.A. Sutherland, "Forrester, Thomas," DCB, Vol. VII at 307.
75. Supra note 29. The disclaimer appearing on the same page as Wilkie's missive begs the
question of why Holland was prepared to print the letter at all, and suggests the possibility that
Wilkie and Holland were clandestine 'fellow travellers.'
76. This point was also to be made against the accused by the crown attorney in Howe:
Chisholm, supra note 22, vol. I at 25.
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neither pen-named author nor named publisher-was charged with libel
on that occasion. Holland understandably was not about to identify
himself in print as the anonymous printer of Wilkie's, in view of the
adverse publicity attending the Marshall imprint. There is in any case no
indication that the government was contemplating the prosecution of
Holland, either instead of or in addition to Wilkie, or that Wilkie
attempted to implicate him as an accessory before the fact. Even before
Wilkie was arraigned, tried, convicted and sentenced, therefore, "Hol-
land had decided that Wilkie's cause could not be safely supported. '77
The legal position in Howe was to be the reverse of Wilkie: in the former,
the avowed publisher (Howe) was prosecuted, though Attorney-General
Archibald, prosecuting in person, insisted that "had the author been given
up, [he] would not have proceeded against the publisher.'' 78 In the latter,
the pen-named author-cum-publisher was prosecuted, while the alleged
printer disavowed all knowledge and was not prosecuted as an accessory.
Just as Wilkie, at trial, acknowledged himself the author of the alleged
libel, moreover, so Howe was to acknowledge himself the publisher.
Determining whom to prosecute for a seditious libel was inevitably more
a political than a legal decision, which had to be made before the
indictment reached the grand jury.
Whether or not the alleged libel was seditious, it was certainly
defamatory, and the judicial development of sedition law had established
the principle that defamatory libel against magistrates was ipso facto
seditious. 79 Bearing in mind that all the members of the governing
Council were ex officio JPs whose writ ran throughout the province, it is
hardly surprising that-sometime before 24 March 1820-William
Wilkie was arrested and charged with libel, pending the grand jury's
return on the crown's indictment."o Whether the same strategem as would
be used five years later to apprehend Forrester on a charge of private
defamatory libel-namely, a bench warrant issued out of the Quarter
77. G. Tratt, "Holland, Anthony Henry," in DCB, Vol. VI, 321, at 322.
78. This was in response to an interruption by the defendant (Howe), who "stated that he had
full permission to give up the author whenever he pleased, but, contrary to the practice in all
such cases [Wilkie!], the name had never been demanded": Chisholm, supra note 22, vol. I
at 77. Even in Nova Scotia it was unusual for either of the law officers to conduct libel
prosecutions in person, that task normally devolving on the resident K.C. Howe, in which
Attorney-General Archibald appears to have intervened personally as a compliment to the
accused, formed an egregious exception to the general rule.
79. On this subject see especially Paul Hamburger's monolithic 1985 article cited by Wright,
supra note 7 at 14, n. 14 and, more recently, M. Lobban, "From Seditious Libel to Unlawful
Assembly: Peterloo and the Changing Face of Political Crime c. 1770-1820" (1990) 10
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 307.
80. Sutherland (supra note 3) states that "Halifax's merchant-dominated Grand Jury indicted
Wilkie on a charge of criminal [sic] libel."
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Sessions at the request of the grand jury, who had returned a true bill on
the indictment~l-was used to arrest Wilkie, seems unlikely. An indict-
ment for sedition was preferred by the law officers on behalf of the
government, not by the grand jury on behalf of the injured party. In any
event Wilkie did not, or could not, post bond. Whether bail was refused
by the JP before whom Wilkie was brought-on the grounds that a
misdemeanour, such as seditious libel, was a non-bailable offence-or
sureties did not come forward to secure the recognizance, moreover, is
also unclear. Wilkie's internment pending trial is probable evidence of
the seriousness with which the government perceived the challenge,
which, though not emanating from the voiceless urban proletariat, was
confessedly offered not only on their behalf, but also on that of the petit
bourgeoisie. Wilkie offered himself as spokesman for both classes: the
one oppressed, the other (witness Wilkie's special pleading on behalf of
the butchers) discriminated against. Though the government's rationale
was to be no different in 1835 from what it had been in 1820, Howe's legal
rights were not trampled upon like Wilkie's: he was not arrested and
forced to enter a recognizance for his appearance in court, nor remanded
in the custody of the sheriff pending the grand jury's preliminary inquiry.
But then Howe's 'libel' was not against the executive government, only
the local magistracy and generally not in their administration-of-justice
mode. Howe's critique involved little more than the mismanagement of
fiscal affairs and municipal public welfare institutions.
William Wilkie was indicted on the same common law basis which,
according to the Epitomist Murdoch, provided that "[s]candalous writ-
ings against the government or individuals are called libels," all of which
are comprehended under the Blackstonian notion of "misdemeanours
that tend to the public injury."s2 If the common law misdemeanour of
seditious libel was the crime for which Wilkie stood indicted, then The
Libel Act 1792 3-the purpose of which "was to remove doubts respect-
ing the functions ofjuries in cases of libel"-was to inform both Wilkie's
self-defence and Chief Justice Blowers's charge to the jury. Received
81. PANS RG 34-312 series P vol. 7, at 190-91 ['Register of the Clerk of the Peace I
from / December 1820 to September 1825'].
82. Murdoch, supra note 45, vol. 4 at 163, 177.
83. (U.K.) 32 Geo. 3, c. 60, popularly known as "Fox's Act." See M. Greenwood & B.
Wright, 'General Introduction: State Trials, the Rule of Law and Executive Powers in Early
Canada,' in idem, eds., Canadian State Trials : Volume One : The Early Period, 1670-1837
(forthcoming) [Toronto: University of Toronto Press and The Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History], at §4.(ii)-Sedition Law; cf. Wright, supra note 7 at 13 et seq. See also T.A.
Green, "The Jury, Seditious Libel and the Criminal Trial," in VerdictAccording to Conscience:
Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1985) at 318 et seq.
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English criminal law and procedure comprehended seditious libel, but
(unlike the legal position in Upper Canada)' it was evidently thought to
be 'reformed' by The Libel Act-the principle in Nova Scotia being that
the reception of remedial English criminal statutes was continuous rather
than instantaneous. The 'invention' of seditious libel in Nova Scotia was
unaffected by the reception question because the province had neither a
prescribed statutory, nor a common-law terminus ante quem determining
the receptibility of English statute law. The legal position in favour of
continuous selective reception had been stated more or less ex cathedra
by Chief Justice Blowers in 1800,11 in which year Upper Canada legis-
lated a retroactive terminal date for the reception of English statute law.
Blowers's commitment to the doctrine of statutory mitigation of the
rigours of the common law would inspire his charge to the Wilkie sedition
trial jury. The chiefjustice was quite prepared to instruct thejury that they
were under no obligation to convict the accused merely on the basis of his
own 'admission of guilt'-so to speak-and to bring The Libel Act
directly to bear on the proceeding. Blowers thus anticipated the 'verdict
according to conscience,' which would be rendered fifteen years later in
84. Wright, supra note 7 at 16.
85. Letter of S.S. Blowers to W. Chipman, (April 1800?: NA MG 23 D I, vol. 1, series i, at
145 et seq. (Chipman family fonds). The rule of the Massachusetts lawyers, as Blowers called
it, achieved the level of stare decisis in Uniacke v. Dickson et al., (1848) 2 N.S.R. 287 (Ch.)
at 290 per Halliburton CJNS-the much misconstrued leading case on reception law in Nova
Scotia:
My venerable predecessor, Chief Justice Blowers ... inclined to the opinion, that those
[English] statutes only which were in amelioration of the common law, and increased
the liberty of the subject, were in force here; and though.., my memory [aet. 75] does
not enable me to mention any particular case [e.g., Wilkie] which he decided upon that
principle, I well recollect that he was invariably influenced by it in all cases to which
it was applicable [e.g., Wilkie].
Though The Libel Act 1792, as 'declaratory' (or rather clarificatory) of the criminal lav of
England, had always been in force in Nova Scotia because of the unique judicial phenomenon
of continuous reception at common law, its application was governed by Murdoch's tenth rule
of statutory construction ('Remedial statutes are to be construed liberally'): supra note 45, vol.
I at 24. But the deployment of this Act in cases of seditious libel did not necessarily increase
the likelihood of an acquittal: Wright, supra note 7 at 16, n. 25. There was one settled aspect
of the common law which stood in no need of confirmation or clarification, and which The Libel
Act did not affect: the accused could not plead the truth of the statements made as a defence to
seditious libel. It is evident from the newspaper accounts of the trial that Wilkie, whom the court
'indulged' by allowing to conduct his own defence, thought that the truth of his 'strictures'
might be pleaded as justification. Howe appeared to make the same procedural error, but the
jury in good conscience forgave him. With all the forensic sophistication which Wilkie's
argument presumably lacked, Howe distinguished between proving 'the truth of a libel,' which
was not material in law or fact, and disproving seditious intention, which was a good defence
in law and which lay within the jury's fact-finding purview.
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favour of Joseph Howe, whose acquittal of the same charge Blowers lived
to see.
The crown took quite a different view. Though there was no question
of proceeding by way of ex officio information, which was beyond the
pale of Nova Scotia's criminal procedure-nor had the grand jury
presentedWilkie as apublic nuisance-the author of the alleged seditious
libel was indicted and publicly prosecuted by the crown on behalf of the
government. On 5 April, the day after Easter Term commenced, the grand
jury examined three witnesses and returned a true bill on the indictment.86
The trial, however, probably due to the volume of civil business, did not
take place for twelve days, until near the end of term; the only other
criminal business on the docket was two prosecutions for larceny and one
for murder.87 Acting as crown attorney under delegation by the law
officers was Samuel George William Archibald KC; it is not altogether
clear why neither of the law officers prosecuted personally, the practice
of king's counsel acting as crown attorneys being officially limited to the
Supreme Court circuits.88 The day before the trial, crown attorney
86. PANS RG 34-312 "P" vol. 8 ('Grand Jury Room Book').
87. PANS RG 39 "C" (HX) box A, file 3 (calendar of criminal proceedings, 1811-1828).
88. King's counsel were first appointed in 1817, in order to relieve the law officers of the
onerous burden of leaving Halifax and travelling the circuits personally to prosecute cases on
behalf of the Crown. The measure was designed to complement the appointment in 1816 of an
associate circuit judge, its rationale being that if there was a Supreme Courtjudge who presided
only on the circuit, then there should also be Crown attorneys who prosecuted only on the
circuit. Archibald, for example, conducted all criminal prosecutions on the Supreme Court's
eastern circuit, which from 1820 onwards included Cape Breton Island. In the official
hierarchy, KCs stood just below the attorney- and solicitor-general [King's Counsel, ex
officio]-to both of which posts Archibald in due course succeeded. In practice, however, the
temptation to draw upon Archibald's outstanding ability as Crown counsel was too great for
the law officers at home in Halifax to resist-the more so in that Archibald had trained for the
bar in the law office of Robie, who became solicitor-general in 1815, and who (from 1817 to
1824) was preoccupied with his duties as Speaker of the House.
The year before Wilkie, Archibald had been compelled-on account of the conflict-of-
interest situation in which his superiors found themselves-to prosecute the prominent lawyer
son and namesake of Attorney-General Richard John Uniacke for murder, for having killed his
opponent in a duel ("Dick's unfortunate affair"). Given the extraordinary circumstances of
both prosecutions, it is understandable that neither Uniacke (1819) nor Wilkie (1820) was cited
by Archibald in his "Petition... praying a remuneration for his services as King's Counsel at
Law between the years 1817 and 1823": PANS RG 5 "P" ['Governor's Petitions'], vol. 41,
doe. 32. Uniacke and Wilkie provide examples of sensational or politically sensitive cases
which the resident King's Counsel was ordered to prosecute on behalf of the Crown because
neither of the law officers could-without impropriety-or wished, to become directly
involved. The law officers clearly arrogated to themselves, and were prepared to exercise, a
discretionary power of delegating to the King's Counsel, as senior Crown attorney, select
criminal prosecutions in the Supreme Court at Halifax. Thus, in the long history of Nova
Scotia's public prosecution service, King's Counsel and Crown attorneys share the same
aetiology.
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Archibald received an anonymous letter from 'A Freeholder,' threaten-
ing him with defeat in the forthcoming general election if the accused
Wilkie were not tried by an impartial jury. 9
Whether or not the (special?) jury as empanelled was impartial, the
accused was "allowed to challenge any of the Jury he pleased"; 90 that was
standard procedure. Following Archibald's stating the prosecution's
case, the accused "acknowledged himself the author of the libel [thus
obviating the need for crown witnesses], 91 and undertook to repeat and
comment upon it, in terms so much more offensive than the mere
language of the libel itself, .... 92 (The same account could have been
given of Howe's defence, substituting only the word "publisher" for
"author.") As there were no defence witnesses and neitherlaw officerwas
prosecuting in person, the crown waived the right of reply to the
prisoner's address. The trial thus proceeded expeditiously to the judge's
charge to the jury, the content of which was far more significant than
either Archibald's opening for the crown or Wilkie's speech in his own
defence. Chief Justice Blowers "instructed the Jury if they could, in their
consciences, believe, that this publication was written with an innocent
intention, and with a view to the public good, to acquit the Prisoner."9"
Though the jury proved by their verdict that they held no such belief, the
principle enunciated was that on which a laterjury would acquit Howe of
an identical charge; this despite the fact that Blowers's successor as chief
justice-Halliburton J, who sat with him for Wilkie and who would
preside alone for Howe-was to be far less candid about the law, and less
careful of the rights of the accused in sedition, than Blowers had been.
94
In 1820 Wilkie was convicted despite Blowers's concise and pellucid
89. (16 April 1820): PANS MG 1, vol. 89, doe. 55 (Samuel George William Archibald
fonds). In the event, Archibald was handily re-elected in his native Colchester District, which
then formed part of greater Halifax County.
90. Nova Scotia Royal Gazette (Halifax), 19 Apr. 1820, at 3. If Wilkie did in fact challenge
any of the prospective jurors, one can only assume that Archibald moved for a tales in order
to complete the number, so that the trial could proceed. Archibald was obliged to do so in Howe,
when a prospective member of the special jury (a former magistrate who was perhaps
unsympathetic to the complaint against the accused) asked to be excused and was allowed by
the court to stand down: Chisholm, supra note 22, vol. I at 24.
91. This admission, which Howe too was to make, could not possibly have been made by the
accused in a libel proceeding before the passage of The LibelAct 1792, because the trial jury
was directed by the court to find the defendant guilty on proof of publication, and of the sense
ascribed to it in the indictment.
92. Supra note 90.
93. Ibid.
94. As much is clear from a collation of their respective charges to the jury in Wilkie and
Howe. For Halliburton's in the latter, see Chisholm, supra note 22, vol. I at 79-82.
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statement of the English statute law applicable to the case,95 while in 1835
Howe was to be acquitted despite Halliburton's failure properly to
instruct the jury. The quality of jurisprudence in the Supreme Court
seemed to have deteriorated commensurately with the chief justice's
continuing involvement in the high politics of government.96 Halliburton
was not the excellent practical lawyer Blowers had been (and Archibald
was); nor was he thejustjudge. It was a matter of inferior lawyers making
even more inferior judges.
The trial jury took only half the time (about five minutes) to convict
Wilkie of seditious libel, as a later one would take to acquit Howe. There
is no record of Wilkie's having made a motion in arrest of judgment, the
only form of criminal appeal existing at common law, and one which was
expressly confirmed by the provisions of The Libel Act 1792. Two days
later, on 19 April, Wilkie was sentenced to "Two years' Imprisonment in
the House of Correction [Bridewel]-there to be kept at hard labor,"97 in
the very penal institution which he had complained was being abused by
the magistrates for purposes of the illegal imprisonment of vagrants.
Chief Justice Blowers was sufficiently uneasy about the propriety of the
verdict, not to mention the severity of the sentence which he was bound
to impose, to announce publicly during the course of his sentencing
speech that "[i]f at the expiration of one year, he should be satisfied that
his [Wilkie' s] habits had become so corrected, as to merit the indulgence,
he would himself apply to the Governor, and obtain a remission of one
year of the sentence now passed on him."98 Blowers was as good as, if not
better than his word. Despite the punitive sentence meted out to him, the
return of Bridewell for the third quarter (July-September) of 1820 makes
clear that Wilkie had already been paroled, if indeed he had served any
part of his custodial sentence at all.99 The remission of sentence which
Wilkie undoubtedly received must have been conditional on his leaving
the province for good: in effect, lifelong ostracism from hearth and home.
95. "On the Trial of an Indictment for a Libel, the Jury may give a general Verdict upon the
whole Matter put in Issue.. .": (U.K.), 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 [marginalium].
96. To make matters worse, Halliburton had not been appointed to the Council until eight
years after his elevation to the bench. By 1835 the chiefjustice, president ex officio, was the
only judge remaining on the Council.
97. The scope of the penal sanction was regulated by the provincial Criminal Punishments
Act, (1816) 56 Geo. 3, c. 6, according to which a convicted misdemeanant could be imprisoned
in the House of Correction for any period not exceeding seven years. The customary sanction
for sedition was imprisonment and fine.
98. Supra note 90.
99. The Quarterly Return of the County Bridewell/ofHalifax September 5l 1820: PANS RG
34-312 series J, file 4. William Wilkie was not among the eleven convicts who had been sent
down from the Supreme Court.
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Scarcely had sentence been passed upon him than at least one of the
Halifax weeklies was reporting a 'deathbed conversion' on the part of the
convicted prisoner: "But we are told, that a very perceptible alteration has
already taken place, both in the language and conduct of the present
youthful offender; in which case we confidently trust, that the utmost
lenity will be extended to him."' ° Clearly, it was.
There were other developments in addition to the pseudonymous pre-
trial letter to the prosecutor which make clear that Wilkie had sympathiz-
ers in town who were prepared to resort to extralegal means to defend him.
The day after Wilkie was sentenced, the meeting of Council-at which
all three of the judges who had sat for the trial were present-was
informed that
anonymous threatening letters have been lately sent to the Justices of His
Majesty's Supreme Court, and to others in Authority [Archibald?], for the
purpose of intimidating them from the performance of their duty. Ordered
that the Crown officers be directed to prepare the draft of a proclamation
offering a Reward of One Hundred Pounds for the discovering the author
or authors of such letters.' 0'
A few days later, the worm had turned: "The Judges," wrote the lieuten-
ant-governor with obvious relief, "have thought better of the Proclama-
tion & requested it may be withheld for the present. I believe Mrs. [Judge
Brenton] Halliburton & Mrs. [Judge James] Stewart [n~e Halliburton]
had been alarmed by the letters, & their good fool husbands had been
obliged to pacify them by the offer of reward."'02 Uxorious discretion
proved to be the better part of judicial valour.
Of Wilkie's subsequent personal history as an ex-convict, nothing is
known. His penal sentence having been remitted, according to old and
partly verifiable tradition Wilkie "was soon released and went away and
never returned."'" 3 The fact that his nephew and namesake, William
100. Weekly Chronicle [Halifax] (21 April 1820); the newspaper's editorializing proprietor,
Loyalist William Minns, was a member of the Commissioners Court, which Willde had
severely criticized.
101. Minutes of Council, 20 April 1820: PANS RG 1, vol. 193 at437. Another version of this
event was confided by the Earl of Dalhousie to his journal:
A fellow named Wilkie, of Radical Politicks, has lately made some noise here by a
slanderous libel published against the Magistracy, & some associates have been writing
threatening letters to the Judges, during this man's trial. I thought them altogether
unworthy of notice, but the Judges do not think so, and a sum of£100, a large sum for
this community, was ordered in Council by Proclamation to any person who shall lead
to the conviction of the offenders .... :
M. Whitelaw, ed., The Dalhousie Journals (Ottawa: Oberon, 1978) vol. 1 at 191.
102. Ibid., 191-92.
103. W.M. Brown [1811-1888], "Recollections of old Halifax," (1908) 13 Collections 75 at
79; Sutherland, supra note 2, at 854. Brown, a younger contemporary of both Akins and
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W[alter?] Wilkie, died in Brooklyn, New York, aged twenty-two, in June
1852, may possibly suggest that the uncle was residing there.' °4 If
William Wilkie indeed emigrated to New York-the circumstantial
evidence suggests that he did-it is inconceivable that he would not have
been among the fifty to sixty Nova Scotian expatriates resident there, who
subscribed the cost of the silver pitcher presented to Howe in May 1835
to commemorate his victory in the sedition trial.105
IV. The Meaning of the Proceeding
How then does one make sense of the sedition proceeding against
William Wilkie? Its unprecedented nature, and the 'political Excite-
ments' occasioned by any prosecution for sedition, 106 suggest that it was
not an integral part of provincial experience. As a tribunal on which all
six of the judges were Loyalists or their sons, and two were brothers-in-
law, could scarcely be thought properly balanced, the Ascendancy,
through its leadership 61ite, preserved and protected legal officialdom
from public criticism. If "rare sensational acquittals... not only embar-
rassed the authorities but raised radical consciousness and helped fuel
reform efforts in the political sphere," 107 --witness the results of Gourlay
in Upper Canada, on the eve of Wilkie, and Howe in Nova Scotia fifteen
years after-then the equally sensational conviction and punitive penal
sanction with which Wilkie concluded not only lowered 'radical con-
sciousness,' but also severely retarded the movement towards political
reform, as well as extinguishing for the moment any hope of law reform.
The historiographical problem thus lies in determining whether Wilkie
had any significance beyond being Nova Scotia's Gourlay, or Howe
avant la lettre. While historians must indeed avoid presentism, they must
also be wary of prolepsis-interpreting Wilkie as mere prototype. When
Howe was tried, the Wilkie case was moot. Howe and his supporters had
excellent political and psychological reasons for not disturbing the status
quo. As far as Howe and the other 'conservative reformers' of the 1830s
Murdoch, like the latter, forebore identifying William Wilkie by name. Though Brown's
account was written after the death of Wilkie's elder brother in 1867, Brown nevertheless
describes the seditionist obliquely as "a brother of [the] late Mr. James C.[W.] Wilkie." Brown
had access to a copy of the pamphlet, from which he quotes a typical passage.
104. J. Holder, comp., Nova Scotia Vital Statistics from Newspapers, 1852-1854 (Halifax:
GANS 1988) at 35: § 522.
105. G.E. Fenety, Life and Times of the Hon. Joseph Howe (Saint John, N.B.: E.S. Carter,
1896) 104 et seq.
106. Paraphrasing Attorney-General John Beverley Robinson, as quoted by Wright, supra
note 7 at 45.
107. Ibid. at 10.
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were concerned, it was as though Wilkie had never taken place. "Reform-
ers of the 1830s, such as Joseph Howe," writes David Sutherland, "never
brought up his [Wilkie's] name when building their critique of Nova
Scotia's oligarchy."10 Given the obvious fact that Wilkie was as radical
as they conservative, why should they have dropped his name? The
discontinuity between Wilkie and Howe was entirely political, the
continuity entirely legal. Howe would not have wanted to emulate the
tragic example of one who prematurely failed and was compelled to leave
the province; nor would he have wished to emulate Wilkie's intemperate
approach. In light of the cautionary tale of Wilkie, it is small wonder that
Howe was desperate to find a lawyer to defend him, and that one could
not be found. The wisdom of hindsight had taught the Halifax bar that
state prosecutions for libel were not defendable.
Similarities between Wilkie and Howe begin with the nature of the
charge and end with the ad hoc nature of the defence. The first of the two
seditious libel prosecutions embroiled the oligarchy in no controversy
more serious than popular resentment against executive overkill. William
Wilkie, though intelligent, well-informed and articulate, was neither a
successful newspaper editor and proprietor, nor the son of an influential
and highly respected magistrate. Wilkie's father was a master mariner, a
rough-and-ready sort who had once pleaded guilty to assault in the same
court in which Joseph Howe's Loyalist father was a senior magistrate.109
John Howe Sr had also been king's printer and postmaster. The unequal
sons of unequal fathers, the pamphleteer Wilkie and the editor Howe were
scarcely comparable in occupational, personal or political terms. Wilkie
nevertheless was what the powers that were intended Howe also to be: an
exemplary show trial. Despite Wilkie's concern with reforming the
administration of justice, and despite the fact that he was himself to be
victimized through "executive influence over the prosecution process,
the jury, and the judiciary,"' 10 he was naive enough to suppose that
sycophantic praise of the Supreme Court judges (three-quarters of whom
were also members of Council)"' would preserve him from the criminal
consequences of his actions or, failing that, guarantee him equal justice
under the law.
108. Supra note 2 at 854.
109. PANS RG 34-312, series P, vol. 9 at 20 (9 June 1815). Yet Captain Wilkie was
respectable and temperate enough to have served two years later on the grand jury: Sutherland,
supra note 2, at 853.
110. Wright, supra note 7 at 48.
111. Wilkie's anacoluthic, stream-of-consciousness style and perversely ironic tone may
have been deliberately inflated, intended to provoke: "But the judges, I am sure, can explain
it ['a defect in our judicial proceedings'] to the satisfaction of EVERY person; for men of
stricter integrity is [sic] not to be found in any part of the inhabitable globe": supra note 28 at 11.
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What Wilkie failed to appreciate was that criticizing any aspect of the
administration of justice was tantamount to attacking the most powerful
and influential members of the government, whose aim was to stop the
mouth of any articulator of popular grievances or propagator of notion-
ally 'radical' ideas. How could a system which was already 'perfect' be
rationally reformed? In striking contrast to sedition in Upper Canada-
as elucidated by Wright-the use of sedition law in Nova Scotia was
"simply a matter of elite conspiratorial manipulation or even instrumental
control." ' As a locus of indirect political interaction between govern-
ment and people, the criminal courts in Nova Scotia at the beginning of
the 1820s must be seen as an arena controlled by the executive through
direct political interaction between the Council and the bench."13
Despite the alienness to the Nova Scotian environment of high pre-
rogative instruments such as the ex officio criminal information, 14 the
crown's proceeding by means of indictment served exactly the same
purpose if the grand jury could always be depended upon to return a true
bill. The crown viewed the grand jury function as merely adjunctive to the
prosecution process; grand juries were more easily and effectively
manipulated than petitjuries-even special ones-and could be 'packed'.
The fact that the government had "resort to criminal law as the means of
repression,""' 5 did not necessarily yield opportunities for contesting
legality. However unjust and oppressive it may have been, the criminal
proceeding against Wilkie was not illegal. The chief reason why a
sedition law was not enacted in Nova Scotia was that the common law
offence of seditious libel, 16 despite the brakes applied by The Libel Act
1792, was still perfectly adequate to the government's purpose; it yielded
no scope for contesting legality, which statute law, such as Upper
Canada's Sedition Act, manifestly did. The Libel Act did not delimit the
crown's freedom of action or the jury's freedom of choice, as the verdict
112. Wright, supra note 7 at 49.
113. Executive oversight of the administration of criminal justice would not finally end until
1837, when the 'dis-integration' of the old, undifferentiated Council into two distinct boards
provided the occasion for getting rid of the old chief justice, who did not by any means go
willingly. Upper Canadian developments, moreover, were reflected in the fact that after 1830
judges were no longer eligible for appointment to the unreconstructed Council. This progres-
sive measure was taken during the administration of Lieutenant-Governor Sir Peregrine
Maitland, 1828-1832, who had been translated from Upper Canada to Nova Scotia.
114. Supra note 45, vol. 4 at 182. The ultra vires character ofex officio informations figures
prominently in the Epitomist's critique of 'the learned commentator' (Blackstone). See
generally P. Girard, "Themes and Variations in Early Canadian Legal Culture: Beamish
Murdoch and his Epitome of the Laws of Nova-Scotia" (1993) 11 Law and History Rev. 101.
115. Wright, supra note 7 at 50.
116. That is, the judicial theorem 'Sedition + Libel = Seditious Libel.'
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of guilty in Wilkie makes clear. Though The Libel Act, which 'arguably
applied to British North America as common law,' remedied judicial
abuses of criminal procedure, it did not affect the character of seditious
libel as substantive criminal law.1 7
Though Wilkie was not the subject of a malicious prosecution, he was
clearly the victim of official repression as a result of the government's
headlong rush to suppress his too-well-informed criticism of the execu-
tive-legislative-judicial complex. Through the attorney-general's mem-
bership in the Council, the government directly controlled the public
prosecution service, and despite Wilkie's being allowedboth to challenge
prospective jurors and to conduct his own defence, he was not "able to
exploit the ideological platform of the proceedings to... embarrass the
authorities in his trial for seditious libel." As Wilkie's plight-even more
so than Gourlay's-demonstrates, "the executive's prosecutorial mo-
nopoly and judicial control ... meant that the struggles were defen-
sive reactions involving fragile claims which in the end could not
withstand" the unprecedented nature of the prosecution.'s Despite the
many and obvious parallels between Wilkie and the Gourlay affair, as
analysed by Barry Wright, there are also dissimilarities which suggest a
much stronger basis for comparison between Gourlay and Howe. Of the
two Nova Scotian cases it is Howe, not Wilkie, 19 which furnishes the
analogue. In Wright's terms, a systematic examination of the discourse
of 'contested legality' found in Howe not only reveals the legal sophis-
tication of the accused, 2 ' but also suggests the prominence of natural
justice in the popular conception of law.
One must beware of an inherent bias in the archival record, however,
which could lead any student of sedition in Nova Scotia to construe Wilkie
in too negative a light and Howe in too positive. A stenographic report of
Howe's defence is available, while all that survives of Wilkie's defence
is a brief, hostile press synopsis. Yet despite the tenuousness of the
evidence, it is clear that Wilkie's defence strategy was essentially the
same as Howe's, and that it arose out of the scope and potential of The
117. An argument could be made that the principles ultimately entrenched in The LibelAct
1792 were articulated in direct response to the Mansfieldian tendency-combatted not only by
Thomas Erskine, but also by Lord Chancellor Camden-to convert fact into law as a means of
keeping the general issue out of the jury's hands.
118. Wright, supra note 7 at 50.
119. An historically significant coincidence between the two proceedings is that the same
Halifax magistrate-merchant Richard Tremain (J.P. 1810)-who in 1835 was to instigate the
prosecution of Howe for seditious libel, in 1820 had been foreman of the grand jury which
returned a true bill on the Wilkie indictment. See D.A. Sutherland, "Tremain, Richard," DCB,
vol. VIER at 891-92.
120. Wright, supra note 7 at 50.
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LibelAct 1792 for allowing the accused in a libel case to appeal to the jury
to render a 'verdict according to conscience'. Wilkie no more denied that
he was the author of the alleged libel, than Howe thathe was the publisher
of it. Yet they both undertook to enlarge upon the contents of the
publication in order to exculpate themselves from the 'legal inference' of
having expressed a seditious intention. Though Chief Justice Blowers
was careful to instruct the jury as to the legal grounds for acquittal,
moreover, thejury was not swayed by the truth and public benefit defence
mounted by the prisoner. Truth was neither a defence to seditious libel,
nor did proving it impute public benefit, contrary to Wilkie's sanguine
expectations. The prosecution of Wilkie, though unique in its time and for
fifteen years afterwards, did not call "into question the legality and
constitutionality of the repression."12' Instead it raised doubts about the
political expediency of repressive over-reaction.
The resources of law which lay at the government's disposal had not
changed during the time elapsing between Wilkie and Howe, though the
attorney-general was no longer a member of the ruling clique. Yet the
verdict in Wilkie strengthened the government's position both legally and
psychologically in dealing with apprehended sedition. Before Wilkie
seditious libel was unheard-of; after Wilkie there was a precedent. The
conviction of Howe was anticipated as a foregone conclusion, not
because the public prosecutors were no longer members of Council, but
because Wilkie had been convicted fifteen years earlier on the same
charge. Even persons prosecuted for defamatory libel'22 were routinely
convicted; a fortiori, someone charged with public libel and prosecuted
on the orders of government. The 'reception' of seditious libel as part of
the criminal law of England, and the implications of the full integration
into government of both the public prosecution service and the judiciary
threw issues about the impartial administration of criminal justice into
sharper relief for Wilkie than for Howe. As in Upper Canada so in Nova
Scotia, the government not only "controlled the initiation of criminal
proceedings" but also, through the attorney-general's membership in the
Council, exercised a virtual monopoly over prosecutions, both private
and public. 123
121. Ibid.at5l.
122. There is only known to have been one such prosecution between Wilkie and Howe: R.
v. Forrester (1825), for criminal defamation.
123. Wright, supra note 7 at 51. John Beverley Robinson was in a weaker position than his
Nova Scotian counterpart in that he was not a member of the Executive Council while attorney-
general. This abuse of power ended in Nova Scotia in 1830, five years before Howe, when
Attorney-General Uniacke died, after having spent twenty-two of his thirty-three years in
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If the successful prosecution of Wilkie in 1820 encouraged the
government to proceed against Howe for seditious libel in 1835, then
Wilkie's principled insistence on representing himself diverged widely
from Howe's unsuccessful quest for a lawyer to represent him. Wilkie's
ghost would have deterred Howe from representing himself-except, of
course, as a last resort. Little wonder that the two or three lawyers whom
Howe tried to retain assured him, in declining his brief, that seditious libel
could not be successfully defended. 24 It had not been in 1820; post hoc,
ergo propter hoc. Whether Wilkie's self-advocateship, like Gourlay's,
"reflects an exploitation of popular anti-lawyer sentiment and a lack of
confidence in counsel's ability to properly exploit the platform of the
proceedings"'15 seems doubtful, in light of his knowledge of criminal
procedure and his determined interest in law reform. All that is known for
sure is that Wilkie was permitted by the court to challenge prospective
jurors; whether he found reason to do so is unknown. It is unlikely that a
special jury, which Wilkie strongly opposed in civil actions, was
empanelled because there was other criminal business down for the term.
(Howe, by contrast, was the only criminal business down for the term in
which it was tried.) Indeed the right to an ordinary jury trial was perhaps
more firmly entrenched in Nova Scotia than in Upper Canada, at the time
when Gourlay and Wilkie were being tried for seditious libel. In Upper
Canada the Sedition Act of 1804 extinguished the common law right to
trial by jury.2 6 Judicial control of the sheriff, who not only picked-or,
on occasion, packed-juries, but who also was the chief constable of the
county, was more palpable. The implication that the sheriff, whose office
was renewable annually, was a mere creature of the judges is highlighted
by the obsequious tone of the letter of resignation which Thomas
Maynard, sheriff of Halifax County from 1816 to 1821, sent to Chief
Justice Blowers, in whose patronage gift the office appeared to lie.127 The
sheriff was controlled by the executive through the judges, who were
themselves prominent members of the executive. An awkward question
office as a member of Council. His successor, Archibald, who in 1825 replaced Robie both as
Speaker of the House and as solicitor-general, was never elevated to the Council; his anti-
Council stance during the "Brandy Election" of 1830, which was also to rob Archibald of the
chief justiceship in 1833-the successful candidate (Halliburton J.) had been a member of
Council for nearly twenty years-effectively precluded Archibald's being invited to replace
Uniacke the Elder on the Council.
124. Chisholm, supra note 22, vol. I at 23. The lawyers' reasoning, of course, was purely
inductive.
125. Wright, supra note 7 at 52.
126. Ibid. at 54.
127. T. Maynard to S.S. Blowers (3 September 1821): PANS RG 1, vol. 411, doc. 101.
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arises: who ordered the county sheriff to arrest Wilkie and hold him
without bail pending the grand jury's return on the indictment?
The independence of the judiciary might potentially have formed the
basis for 'contested legality,' as was true of Upper Canada, had it not
presupposed the exclusion of the judges from the Council. Administra-
tively and politically such an exclusion would have been difficult to
achieve, not only because the chief justice was ex officio president of the
Council and an influential participant in both executive and legislative
business, but also because two of the three Supreme Court judges
belonging to the Council in 1820 had been members of that body before
their elevation to the bench. The same provincial act of 1809 which
excluded judges from the House of Assembly, 128 explicitly provided for
maintaining the status quo on judicial membership in the Council, 129
which persisted until 1837. Given the presence of Lord Chief Justice
Ellenborough in the British cabinet in 1806-7, it is hardly surprising that
colonial judges were not declared ineligible for Council membership.
Both Wilkie and Howe were therefore tried by the ex officio president of
the same body as made the purely political decision to order a seditious
libel prosecution. Judges could scarcely have been independent "from
the influence of the provincial executive" 130 while remaining active
members of the Council. The republican constitutional separation of
powers into three distinct executive, legislative and judicial branches
simply did not exist in Nova Scotia in 1820, though the movement
towards it had begun a decade earlier. The process accelerated in 1830,
when Whitehall decided that judges henceforth would not be appointed
to fill vacancies in the Council, but it was not yet complete by 1835, when
Joseph Howe was tried by Chief Justice Halliburton, who was then in his
twentieth year of Council membership.
Seditious libel proved so successful an instrument in silencing the
voice of reform in 1820, during the Loyalist Ascendancy, that it was ill-
advisedly used again in 1835, after the Ascendancy had ended. As in
Upper Canada so in Nova Scotia, trials for sedition were designed to
"portray criticism as disloyalty, powerfully delineating the loyal commu-
nity and its enemies for popular contemplation."'' The paradox was that
in Nova Scotia, where the need for an imperial statutory counterweight
to repressive provincial legislation did not exist, The LibelAct 1792 was
considered in force because it bulked large in both the 1820 and the 1835
128. S.N.S. 1809 c. 15, s. 8.
129. The third puisne, appointed pursuant to the Judges Act ibid., was, within four years of
its passage, also appointed to the Council.
130. Wright, supra note 7 at 54.
131. Ibid.at56.
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sedition proceedings. Wilkie attempted unsuccessfully to use the act 'to
contest the repression'-a defence strategy to which the paternalistic
Chief Justice Blowers was not unsympathetic, and which he forthrightly
acknowledged in his charge to the jury; Howe's powerful evocation of
The Libel Act inspired the jury to disregard the opinion and direction of
the trial judge and render a general verdict in his favour. Whereas in
Upper Canada, those subject to sedition proceedings had two strikes
against them in the enforcement of the provincial Sedition Act and the
ambiguous status of The LibelAct 1792, in Nova Scotia the opposite was
true. The only sedition law there was in Nova Scotia was common law,
ameliorated by 'declaratory' acts such as The Libel Act. Executive
regulation of political discourse did not extend so far as to deny to anyone
accused of seditious libel the benefits of a remedial statute, construed
liberally.
Contemporaneous with the first third of the nineteenth century, T.B.
Akins's perspective on Wilkie was coloured by the subsequent acquittal
of Howe-an event to which Akiniwas an eyewitness. The conventional
wisdom of hindsight-post Howe-led Akins to assert that public
opinion-post Wilkie-had convicted the government of extreme tyr-
anny and cruelty for its treatment of the accused. Akins's conclusion,
"The pamphlet [Wilkie' s] was a very paltry offence, such as at the present
day [1839] would be passed over with contempt," 13 2 was politically naive.
Howe's own 'very paltry offence' had not been 'passed over with
contempt' a mere four years before Akins delivered history's verdict on
Wilkie; instead Howe was charged with the same crime of which Wilkie
had been convicted. The government had not changed its mind in the
interim; thejury simply brought in a different verdict. Paraphrasing Barry
Wright, opposition legal victory in the form of an acquittal did indeed
embarrass the government in a very public way, and the counter-
hegemonic success arguably discouraged resort to sedition prosecutions
after 1835.11 Legal struggles, such as Wilkie and Howe, did not figure
prominently in the pre-Responsible Government experience of Nova
Scotia; indeed, there would not be another prosecution for seditious libel
until McLachlan in 1923. Yet the historic acquittal of Howe retroactively
conferred historical significance on Wilkie, who had proffered similar
criticism of the vested interests and who made a similar legal defence of
his fundamental right to do so. Thus does the rehabilitation of Wilkie
really begin with the verdict in Howe. As history is written by the victors,
132. Supra note 1.
133. Wright, supra note 7 at 56-7.
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and orthodoxy-no less in history than in theology-is the view that
prevails, Wilkie came to be understood strictly in terms relative to Howe.
Taken together, Wilkie and Howe demonstrate that the judicial defini-
tion of sedition in early nineteenth-century Nova Scotia comprehended
a seditious libel. Unlike the situation in Upper Canada during the Gourlay
affair, 1818-19, legal proceedings for sedition in Nova Scotia did not
advance beyond the first stage involving prosecutions for seditious libel,
which led to ajury acquittal only in the second of the two trials. The earlier
case, especially, highlighted the fact that no distinction was drawn
between sedition and what Murdoch called "libels against the executive
government." 1 Wilkie throws into sharp relief the contours of the legal
terrain because it was the Urtext-isolated, unprecedented and almost
unique. Had Wilkie been acquitted, as Gourlay was, the affair might have
become no less celebrated than the Howe sedition trial fifteen years later.
As matters turned out, however, Wilkie's conviction led effectively to
ostracism, de facto banishment and oblivion, while the original, seditious
character of Howe was lost to history. The so-called 'libel trial' assumed
the qualities of cultic myth-thanks to Howe's subsequent transfigura-
tion as political messiah-providing an object lesson in history as
iconography. This is not to say that Howe was not immeasurably more
than Wilkie redux: the second prosecution for seditious libel "backfired
badly" and provided a much-needed fillip to the unfocused, leaderless
and amorphous reform movement in Nova Scotia, which had stagnated
since Wilkie's downfall. What was true in Gourlay's case, moreover,
applied equally to both Wilkie andHowe: the only alternative to a trial for
sedition was not to prosecute at all, 35 which would perhaps have made
more sense both legally and politically.
At least in Wilkie, the gerontocrats who were in such high dudgeon
over the scope of Wilkie's "strictures" that they were determined to
avenge themselves on him for publishing them, were spared the embar-
rassment of a jury acquittal. Ydt Wilkie's immolation by the oligarchy
prepared the way for Howe's "counter-hegemonic triumph," because the
same solution to what was thought to be the same problem, under what
were thought to be ideally unchanged conditions, was again resorted to
with every expectation of success. Chief among the major differences
between Wilkie and Howe is that one was a radical reformer, while the
other a 'conservative reformer.' Howe had friends and admirers among
the lawyers of his time-one of them was Attorney-General Archibald,
who prosecuted-while Wilkie seems to have gone out of his way to
134. Supra note 45, vol. 4 at 181.
135. Wright, supra note 7 at 32.
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alienate lawyers and make for himself dangerous enemies within the
legal-official clique. He underestimated the degree of fusion of judicial
authority and coercive state power in the operation of the public prosecu-
tion service. The legal profession closed ranks around their persecuted
brother, lawyer Clarke, and repaid Wilkie, whom the press tended to
patronize as ajuvenile delinquent, in his own currency. Wilkie' s thought-
ful proposals for reforming the administration ofjustice, 13 6 in the interests
of 'equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimina-
tion .. .,' were viewed by lawyer-politicians and judge-politicians alike
as being the stuff of which sedition is made.
Wilkie, like Howe after him, believed that that right to bona fide public
criticism of governance and the administration of justice, which now
forms an 'Exception' to the Criminal Code strictures against sedition, 137
could be upheld in the courts. In terms of its negative impact on the
political struggle for reform, moreover, the failure of Wilkie was no less
great than the success of Howe. Legal contests such as Wilkie and Howe,
despite their very different outcomes and consequences, were show trials
and propaganda exercises which "remind us about the limits of action
within the pre-modern political culture of British North America in the
first third of the nineteenth century.' ' 3s
136. Indeed, Wilkie's animadversions on sundry aspects of the administration ofjustice may
be interpreted as a critique of the first, tentative postwar steps towards penal law reform and
statutory law revision, of which Wilkie was perhaps a little overcritical. On the prehistory of
law reform, and for a consideration of the circumstances which may have given rise to Wilkie's
interest in the subject, see J. Phillips, "The Reform of Nova Scotia's Criminal Law, 1830-
1841," typescript, 44 p. (paper presented at the Canadian Law in History Conference, Carleton
University, June 1987). I am grateful to Dr. Phillips for allowing me to consult this unpublished
paper, which forms part of a larger work-in-progress on the history of the criminal justice
system in Nova Scotia, 1749-1815.
137. Section 60. Much the same point was made by Chief Justice Blowers in his charge to the
jury in Wilkie.
138. J.M. Bumsted, The Peoples of Canada:A Pre-Confederation History (Toronto: Oxford
University Press 1992), vol. I at 232. What is true of'theNovascotian case' [R. v. Howe] is truer
still of Wilkie. The memory of Wilkie remained green in radical reform circles in Halifax.
Writing in Howe's newspaper, the Novascotian, on 19 November 1834, 'The People' [George
Thompson] commented on "[t]he odium that has hitherto attached to the character of professed
reformers"-a transparent reference to William Wilkie. The second letter from 'The People,'
published on 1 January 1835, resulted in Joseph Howe's being charged with seditious libel.
